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INTRODUCTION
No subject of domestic concern has received more public atten-
tion in recent times than environmental air pollution. 1 Public concern
1 In 1971, most major U.S. cities are afflicted with some degree of air pollution. At
the present time air pollution is essentially an urban phenomenon, occurring when the
capacity of the air to assimilate and dilute pollutants reaches saturation. Population and
industrial growth, combined with increased dependence upon motor vehicles, have dras-
tically increased the volume and variety of gaseous emissions contaminating the air. The
five major classes of pollutants spewed into the atmosphere of the United States at
the rate of over 200 million tons per year consist of: carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide,
hydrocarbons, nitrogen oxide and particulate matter, The Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) reports that in 1968 some 102 million tons of carbon monoxide
(CO) were emitted in the United States, half of all major pollutants emitted that year.
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with air pollution has increased steadily since the first major air pol-
lution "incident" in the Meuse Valley of Belgium in 1930, where
smog claimed sixty-three lives and left six thousand ill.a Chemical
analysis subsequent to the tragedy disclosed that the air at that time
contained some thirty pollutants. The first shocking incident in the
United States occurred in 1948 in Donora, Pennsylvania, where an
air pollution crisis caused some twenty deaths and affected, in vary-
ing degrees of severity, some forty-two percent of the population.'
Over five thousand deaths were attributed to air pollution in London,
England, as a result of three air pollution incidents between 1952 and
1962.4
 Serious air pollution crises have become alarmingly frequent
in recent years. In New York, in 1966, one hundred deaths were at-
tributed to air pollution.' Other incidents have occurred in Philadel-
phia, in 1966, and in St. Louis, in 1969.°
Recently, in Chicago, following a period of extremely concen-
trated pollution resulting from a sustained temperature inversion, 7
three times more deaths from tracheal bronchitis were reported than
More than half of this CO was produced by automobiles. The following table illustrates
emissions during the year 1968:
ESTIMATED NATIONWIDE EMISSIONS-1968*
[In millions of tons per year]
Car-
bon	 Nitro-
	monox- Particu- Sulfur Hydro-
	 gen
Source	 ide	 lates	 oxides carbons	 oxides	 Total
Transportation 	 63.8 1.2 0.8 I6.6 8.1 90.5
Fuel Combustion in
Stationary Sources 	 1.9 8.9 24.4 0.7 10.0 45.9
Industrial Processes 	 9.7 7.5 7.3 4.6 0.2 29.3
Solid Waste Disposal 	 7.8 1.1 0.1 1.6 0.6 11.2
Miscellaneous 16.9 9.6 0.6 8.5 1.7 37.3
Total 	 100.1 29.3 33.2 32.0 20.6 214.2
* Source: National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA), a department
of HEW, NAPCA Inventory of Air Pollution Emissions, 1970, 116 Cong. Rec. 16,101
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
2 Newman, Air Pollution, Current History, vol. 59, no. 347, July, 1970 at 20
[hereinafter cited at Newman].
8 See Chass & Feldman, Tears for John Doe, 27 S. Cal. L. Rev. 349, 356 (1954).
4 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 465 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings].
5
 Id. at 1480.
• Id.
7 A temperature inversion is a weather pattern in which an air mass remains sta-
tionary over a geographical region for a long period of time, trapping pollutants in the
air. The air literally becomes stagnant and is not dissipated. The pollutants that pour
into the air from the various sources continue to become more concentrated, and hazard-
ous to health, until a wind blows the stagnant air mass away, or until a new air mass,
bringing fresh air, moves in. Newman, supra note 2, at 20.
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had been projected, and the death rate from this cause among children
was increased by fifty percent. 8 Health workers in the field of respira-
tory diseases are now generally agreed that air pollution causes serious
health effects. One expert has commented:
Chronic respiratory disease is now the leading cause of dis-
ability among adults in all the industrial parts of northern
Europe and is becoming increasingly prevalent in the United
States . . . . Like chronic bronchitis, cancer, and many other
types of pathological manifestations, the multifarious effects
of environmental pollutants may not be detected until several
decades after the initial exposure.
The potentially lethal effects described in this comment are expected
to become increasingly common in large cities, with ten thousand
deaths in one crisis predicted for a major west coast city by 1980.' 4'
A substantial volume of legislation, both federal and state, has
been proposed to control this burgeoning menace." To date, however,
the legislative attempts to ameliorate the problem have proven inade-
quate, and the threat to the nation's health continues to grow at an
alarming rate." The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 represent the
most recent federal attempt to deal with the problem." Compared with
previous federal legislation, this Act is the toughest and most contro-
versial anti-pollution law yet enacted by Congress. It has been de-
8 	Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 465. A Chicago scientist has estimated that
a five-fold reduction in Chicago's average annual sulfur dioxide concentration would
reduce the number of deaths from cancer by about 800 per year. Id. In March, 1970,
HEW reported that in Chicago safe levels of air pollution are exceeded thirty percent
of the time. Id. at 1025.
0 116 Cong. Rec. 16,231 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970) (remarks of Senator Murphy),
quoting from Rene Dubos, Man, Medicine and Environment.
10 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1480.
11 For a comprehensive analysis of state antipollution statutes, see generally Com-
ment, State Air Pollution Control Legislation, 9 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 712 (1968);
Symposium on Air Pollution, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 203, 232-324 (1968). Concern over the
deadly effects of air pollution has grown such that by the fall of 1970 more than 600
anti-pollution bills had been introduced in the 91st Congress. 49 Cong. Dig. 193 (1970).
Of these, approximately 160 were anti-air pollution bills, including a large number directed
toward establishing automobile emission standards, Id. at 224. This is doubtless the
highest concentration of congressional attention ever devoted to a single issue in such
a short period of time.
12 There is an emerging pessimism among scientists to the effect that the air pollution
problem is attaining such proportions that the nation may not be able to purify the air
once it has been permeated by pollution. See Hill, Air Pollution Grows Despite Rising
Public Alarm, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1969, at 1, col. 3. At the dawn of this decade, the
President cautioned the nation: "The 1970's absolutely must be the years when America
pays its debt to the past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters, and our living
environment. It is literally now or never." 116 Cong. Rec. 16,096 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1970).
18 Pub. L. No. 91-604, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 31, 1970) [hereinafter cited as
the Clean Air Amendments of 19701. The Act is, in farm, an amendment to the Air
Quality Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. §0 1857-8571 (Supp. V, 1970).
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scribed as "the toughest, most far-reaching environmental legislation
ever enacted by Congress.'" 4
This comment will examine the various important provisions of
the 1970 Act and their effectiveness in controlling air pollution. Its
specific focus will be upon the Act's controversial provisions imposing
new and far-reaching controls upon motor vehicle air pollution.' 5
Finally, possible constitutional issues raised by the new motor vehicle
provisions will be considered.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE 1970 ACT
A. Previous Federal Air Pollution Legislation
The federal air pollution control program began in 1955 with a law"
authorizing the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
to research the problem and to provide technical assistance to state, city
and local governments in their anti-air pollution endeavors.' 7
 In 1960,
Congress authorized the Public Health Service to study the effects of
motor vehicle pollution upon health, and ordered the Surgeon General
to report to Congress within two years." Public pressure for action to
combat the growing problem led to the enactment of the Clean Air Act
of 1963.10 This Act continued federal funding of state air pollution con-
trol programs, but more importantly, it also provided for federal en-
forcement in cases concerning interstate pollution. 2° The Act also
designated three specific areas for research: control of motor vehicle
exhaust emissions,2" removal of sulfur from fuels, 22 and development of
14 Boston Globe, Jan. I., 1971, at 2, col. 1 (quoting Senator Muskie).
15
 The National Society of Professional Engineers testified at the 1970 Senate Hear-
ings that pollution resulting from internal combustion automobile engines "contributes
about 64% of all air pollutants on a national average annual basis-80% in Washington,
D.C. and 88% in Los Angeles." 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 114.
15 Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, §I 1-7, 69 Stat. 322, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§
1857-8571 (Supp. V, 1970).
17
 When the first federal legislation was passed in 1955, there were no viable,
on-going state anti-pollution programs in existence. There was little interest in the
problem of air pollution on the part of the scientific community, and the public gen-
erally regarded "air pollution" as meaning dust and smoke. Smog was considered a
problem unique to Los Angeles. By late August of 1970, however, concern with the prob-
lem had increased to the extent that there were 55 state and territorial programs and
144 local agencies in existence. By the end of 1970 it was expected that all states would
have established air pollution control legislation. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,105 (daily ed. Sept.
21, 1970).
18 Act of June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-493, 74 Stat. 162. These early federal efforts
were limited to researching the problem and to determining means of controlling the
growing menace. The underlying rationale of these enactments was that state and local
governments had the basic responsibility for dealing with the problem, and that the
federal government would provide technical assistance to aid the states in whatever
enforcement programs they might individually initiate.
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-8571 (1964).
20 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(1)(A) (1964).
21 42 U.S.C. § 1857e(a) (1964).
22
 42 U.S.C. § 1857b(a)(4) (1964).
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air quality criteria." The federal enforcement action was a three-step
process: conference, hearing, and, if necessary, court proceedings. 24
In 1965, the Clean Air Act was amended to provide for tighter fed-
eral control of automotive emissions. All new 1968 and future model
vehicles had to be designed or equipped so as to prevent or control
pollution." HEW was required to establish national standards for auto-
mobile exhaust emissions." Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of
HEW established progressively stricter emission standards for each
model year, beginning with 1968 model vehicles." In 1966, the Act was
again amended to authorize increased grants to state air pollution
control agencies for maintenance of air pollution control programs,
equipment and facilities. 2"
B. The Air Quality Act of 1967
The Air Quality Act of 1967" signalled a major revision in the
federal air pollution control program. It set in motion a new regional
approach to establishing and enforcing federal-state air quality stan-
dards. In addition to authorizing added funds for regulatory control
programs at the state and local levels," the Act required the Secretary
of HEW to designate regional "atmospheric areas" across the continen-
tal United States.' Next, the Secretary had to designate "air quality
control regions" within these atmospheric areas." 2
 These regions in-
cluded groups of communities which shared common air pollution prob-
lems, irrespective of state boundaries. The Secretary was also required
to promulgate air quality criteria for each region, based upon scientific
studies and describing the harmful effects of a particular pollutant upon
"health and welfare."" The Secretary was further required to issue
23 42 U.S.C.	 1857b(c) (1964).
24 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (1964).
25 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1, 18571-2(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1967).
20 42 U.S.C. § 18571-1 (Supp. II, 1967).
27 116 Cong. Rec. 16,103 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
28 42 U.S.C. § 1857c (Supp. II, 1967).
22 42 U.S.C. § 1857-8571 (Supp. V, 1970). •
Bo 42 U.S.C. § 1857c (Supp. V, 1970).
81 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (Supp. V, 1970). An "atmospheric area" is a section of the
country in which climate, meteorology and topography are essentially the same. These
factors were chosen as determinative in identifying areas because they determine the
capacity of the atmosphere to dilute assimilated pollutants. The Secretary of HEW
divided the United States into eight such atmospheric areas.
82 Id. The Secretary was to have finished designating ninety such regions by the
summer of 1970. But by July, 1970, he had designated only forty of them. 116 Cong.
Rec. 16,104 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
88 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(b) (Supp. V, 1970). The Department of HEW first issued
documents on air quality criteria and control methods for two pollutants, sulfur oxides
and particulate matter, in February, 1969. In March, 1970, criteria and control docu-
ments were issued for three more pollutants: carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons and photo-
chemical oxidants. Criteria for lead, nitrogen oxides, fluorides and polynuclear organic
compounds are to be issued in 1971. In late 1970, HEW was continuing its study of
thirty different pollutants to determine their potential effects upon health. Criteria
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control technology documents, demonstrating the feasibility, costs and
effectiveness of proposed pollution prevention and control techniques."
The states were then responsible for setting regional air quality stan-
dards to limit the levels of the pollutants described in the criteria issued
by HEW." After developing these standards, the states had to establish
comprehensive plans for their implementation." Given the time allow-
ances established in the 1967 Act for adopting standards and implement-
ing plans, the process could consume as much as a year and a half; 37
and the process of obtaining the Secretary's approval of the plans, re-
quired for federal funding, would necessarily consume even more time."
This entire time-consuming process had to be repeated each time HEW
issued criteria and control techniques for a newly-evaluated pollutant.
This inordinate waste of time marked one of the major weaknesses of
the 1967 Act. As of July, 1970, only seventeen states had submitted stan-
dards to HEW, and only ten had their standards approved. More la-
mentably, however, no implementation plans had been approved by
HEW as of September 21, 1970. 39 Primary responsibility for enforce-
ment of the standards, once approved by HEW, continued to rest with
state and local governments." However, the Secretary of HEW was
empowered to intervene to enforce state standards if the air pollution
travelled interstate, and if the offending state was not adequately en-
forcing its standards.' But if the pollution was only intrastate, the
Secretary could not act unless requested to do so by the governor of the
state.' Provision was also made in the 1967 Act to research air pollu-
tion caused by fuel combustion. The Secretary of HEW had the author-
ity to withdraw any fuel from interstate commerce if the manufacturer
of the fuel or fuel additive failed to register a statement of its contents
with the Secretary."
The Air Quality Act of 1967 continued federal grants to the states
to assist them in developing programs for the inspection and testing
of motor vehicle anti-pollution devices." But the Act provided for
federal preemption in the establishment of emission standards for pollu-
tant emissions from new motor vehicles." The states were precluded
documents were to be issued as each pollutant was fully evaluated. See generally 116
Cong. Rec. 16,103-104 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
84 42 U.S.C. § I857c-2(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
88 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
BO Id.
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (Supp. V, 1970).
88 Id.
88 116 Cong. Rec. 16,104 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
40 42 U.S.C.	 1857d(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
41 42 U.S.C.	 1857d(c)(4)(i) (Supp. V, 1970).
42 42 U.S.C.	 1857d(c)(4)(ii) (Supp. V, 1970).
43 42 U.S.C.	 1857f-6c (Supp. V, 1970).
44 42 U.S.C.	 18571-6b (Supp. V, 1920).
45 42 U.S.C.	 1857f-6a(a) (Supp. V, 1970). By virtue of § 1857f-6a(b), of the
1967 Act, California was the only state authorized to set standards for new motor vehicles.
National emission standards for new motor vehicles, applicable first to the 1968 models,
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from setting emission standards for new vehicles on the theory that a
multiplicity of state standards, differing from one state to another,
would make it impossible for the automakers to meet all of them."
Nothing was said in the Act of standards for old motor vehicles, pre-
sumably leaving the states free to legislate their own standards.
Despite the foregoing provisions, however, the 1967 Act, and its 1963
and 1955 predecessors, were generally criticized as being ineffectual in
imposing meaningful controls upon air pollution.47
C. The Failings of the 1967 Act
The criticisms leveled against the 1967 Act basically focused upon
the following asserted shortcomings: (1) the cumbersome and time-
consuming procedures required for the establishment of pollution stan-
dards;" (2) inadequate funding at the federal, state and local levels; 49
(3) a paucity of skilled personnel to enforce control measures, and the
failure to provide for the training of such personnel in sufficient num-
bers;" (4) organizational problems at the federal level, where air
were promulgated by HEW on March 31, 1966. More stringent national standards for
the 1970 model year were promulgated on June 4, 1968, and, on February 10, 1970, the
Secretary of HEW published an advance notice of proposed rule making, indicating
HEW's intent to adopt even more stringent standards for the 1973 and 1975 model
years. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1639.
40 Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1085 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Currie].
47 Numerous writers have traced the development of air pollution control laws in
the United States. For comprehensive analyses of both federal and state laws, and the
relative impact of those laws, see Currie, supra note 46; O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air
Quality Act of 1967, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 275 (1968); Symposium on Air Pollu-
tion, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 205, 232-324 (1968); Comment, Air Pollution, Pre-emption,
Local Problems and the Constitution—Some Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10 Ariz. L.
Rev. 97, 104-06 (1968); Cassell, The Health Effects of Air Pollution and Their Implica-
tions for Control, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 197 (1968).
48 See discussion on p. 576 supra.
49 The 1967 Act authorized expenditures of up to $394 million for a five-year
research and development program for the control of sulfur oxide emissions from sta-
tionary sources—$215 million to be spent between 1968 and 1970. Yet, in this three-year
period, the estimated actual expenditures totalled only $82 million—$133 million below
the authorized amount. Funds were provided also to stimulate research and development
of required technology. This research and development effort has been severely under-
funded. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,214 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). State and local governments
have been equally unwilling to spend the requisite amounts for air pollution control.
For a state-by-state analysis of state expenditures, and federal assistance for the funding
of state, local and regional air pollution control programs as of January 1, 1970, see
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 443-46.
00 In 1967, it was estimated that the staff of the National Air Pollution Control
Administration (NAPCA) of HEW would have to increase to 1,900 in fiscal 1970 if the
Air Quality Act of 1967 were to be adequately implemented. Yet, as of May 1, 1970,
NAPCA had only 971 staff members. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,214 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
The 1970 HEW report to the Congress, entitled "Manpower and Training Needs for
Air Pollution Control," indicated that most state air pollution control agencies are also
understaffed. Recruitment of competent personnel is difficult. The biggest problem is
the low compensation paid by state and local agencies. Typical salaries fall 20% to
50% below the median paid by industry for comparable positions. The HEW Report
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pollution had not been accorded high priority;" and (5) failure on the
part of the Department of HEW to perform its duties adequately under
the 1967 Act." Perhaps most disappointing was HEW's failure to inter-
pret properly the congressional intent underlying the new motor vehicle
testing provision of the 1967 Act.53 Under this provision the Depart-
ment of HEW had the power to test new motor vehicles to assure their
compliance with established national emission standards. The provision
read as follows:
(a) Upon application of the manufacturer, the Secretary
shall test, or require to be tested, in such manner as he deems
appropriate, any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle en-
gine submitted by such manufacturer to determine whether
such vehicle or engine conforms with the regulations pre-
scribed under section 1857f-1 of this title. If such vehicle or
engine conforms to such regulations the Secretary shall issue
a certificate of conformity, upon such terms, and for such
period not less than one year, as he may prescribe.
(b) Any new motor vehicle or any motor vehicle engine
sold by such manufacturer which is in all material respects
substantially the same construction as the test vehicle or en-
gine for which a certificate has been issued under subsection
(a), of this section, shall for the purposes of this chapter be
deemed to be in conformity with the regulations issued under
section 1857f-1 of this title." (Emphasis added.)
However, the Department of HEW interpreted this provision to mean
that it could test only a prototype of the vehicle or vehicle engine
submitted by the manufacturer, and not, as the Congress intended, to
test vehicles coming off the assembly line or to require any additional
tests the Secretary deemed appropriate. Senator Muskie castigated the
HEW representatives at the 1970 Hearings for their failure to exercise
estimates that by 1974 state and local agencies will need 8,000 additional personnel in
order to implement the Federal Act adequately—an increase of 300% over the number
currently employed in these programs. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,105 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
51
 Indicative of this low priority status are the funding and manpower statistics
set forth in notes 49 and 50 supra.
82 See note 32 supra. In addition to failing to designate the requisite ninety air
quality regions by July, 1970, the Department of HEW failed to publish within a reason-
able time criteria for the five identified pollutants, as required under the 1967 Act. See 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-2(b) (Supp. V, 1970); 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 1188. In
addition, the Secretary of HEW did not utilize the power granted to him under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-6c to gather information regarding fuels and fuel additives. 1970 Senate Hearings,
supra note 4, at 483, 1044. The Secretary assessed no penalties for violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ I857f-2 (Supp. V, 1970), the "Prohibited Acts" Section of the 1967 Act. 1970 Senate
Hearings, supra note 4, at 380. The penalty provided was a $1,000 fine. Sec 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-4. (Supp. V, 1970). The only enforcement action taken by the Secretary, how-
ever, was the obtainment of a permanent injunction in 1969 to prevent the illegal im-
portation of new motor vehicles. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 380.
53 42 US.C. § 18571-5 (Supp. V, 1970).
54 Id.
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their full automobile inspection power•' The unfortunate consequence
of HEW's narrow interpretation of its powers was that the testing of
prototypes failed utterly in forcing the auto industry to comply with
the national emission standards established under the 1965 and 1967
Acts." A study of vehicles on the road conducted by HEW in Novem-
ber, 1969, showed that more than fifty percent of the vehicles tested
failed to meet either the hydrocarbon or carbon monoxide standard, and
that for one model vehicle, more than eighty percent of the vehicles
tested failed one or more tests." This discrepancy between the average
emission rates of the prototypes submitted by the automakers, and the
average emission rates of the vehicles in the hands of the public has
created a deplorable situation. It is estimated that air quality in 1985
will be twenty-five percent higher in levels of hydrocarbons, thirteen
percent higher in carbon monoxide, and twenty-five percent higher in
oxidant concentrations than it would have been if HEW had not per-
mitted this discrepancy in emission rates between 1968 and 1970.' 8
The Air Quality Act of 1967 was clearly an inadequate and in-
effective measure to cope with the growing pollution problem. In addi-
tion to the shortcomings noted, however, the Act also suffered from
inadequate enforcement provisions. The federal government had no
jurisdiction to abate pollution from stationary sources within a state
unless such pollution endangered the health and welfare of citizens in
another state, that is, unless it created an "interstate" problem. If the
air pollution occurred solely within the boundaries of a single state, the
federal government was powerless to intervene, unless the governor of
such state requested federal enforcement assistance." Apparently no
governor had requested such aid since the passage of the 1967 Act."
Even where the federal government did have jurisdiction to act, the
only court action which could be taken to check pollution from station-
ary sources was a proceeding for an injunction e1 The only remedy for
00 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess, 167-69, 362-64,
371-72, 1226 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings].
58 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
57 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 363.
58 Id. at 372. The language in the 1970 Act's version of the auto inspection pro-
vision, and that of the Senate Committee Report and House-Senate Conference Report,
clarify the inspection power to require assembly line testing of individual vehicles. Clean
Air Amendments of 1970 § 206; S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970);
Conference Report, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 50-51 (1970).
5° 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c)(4)(ii) (Supp. V, 1970).
00 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 389. The states appear reluctant to
request such assistance even in the face of strong citizen pressure to do so. For example,
the citizens of West Virginia made numerous appeals to their Governor to request aid
in abating pollution allegedly caused by Union Carbide Corporation, but their pleas were
fruitless. See West Virginians Appeal for Air Pollution Abatement, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11,
1970, at 42, col. 1. The decision on the part of a state to refrain from taking action may
well be influenced by political and economic pressure. See discussion on p. 580 infra.
01 42 U.S.C.	 1857d(k) (Supp. V, 1970).
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non-compliance was the court's contempt power, since the 1967 Act
provided no fines for noncompliance by a stationary source polluter."
Placing the authority for establishing air quality standards with
the states also weakened the 1967 Act. Few states had the expertise,
manpower or funds essential for the development of realistic standards.
In all, only ten states' standards had been approved by HEW as of late
September, 1970, and no state implementation plan had been approved
by HEW." There was no authority for the states to enforce proposed
standards until their implementation plans were approved.°4 Another
weakness inherent in relegating the establishment of standards to the
states derived from the fact that large industries in a state could bring
to bear substantial political pressure against proposed standards. Given
the importance of resident industries to a state's tax base, few state
governments would gamble on the possibility that setting strict stan-
dards would result in valuable industries moving to another state."
Finally, the federal preemption of new motor vehicle emission standards
precluded action by those states With severe automobile pollution prob-
lems." Yet, as discussed above, federal (HEW) inspection and enforce-
ment of new motor vehicle standards was a failure," and the 1967 Act
provided no federal enforcement power to help the states deal with the
millions of used vehicles on the road—the most serious source of auto-
mobile air pollution. The combination, then, of cumbersome procedures
for the control of air pollution, the absence of adequate funding, in-
effective enforcement provisions, and the unwillingness on the part of
the Department of HEW to utilize fully its powers of inspection, all
contributed to the failure of the 1967 Act to stimulate any meaningful
progress in abating the growing problem of air pollution."
II. THE CLEAN Am AMENDMENTS OF 1970
With the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the
Congress has again sought to provide the nation with its first truly
effective anti-air pollution legislation. The 1970 Act is divided into four
titles: Title I concerns air pollution caused by stationary sources;
Title II concerns moving source, or vehicular, air pollution; Title III
embodies a variety of "general" provisions, including a controversial
"citizen suits" provision and a judicial review provision; Title IV con-
82 Id. Fines were provided only for violations of the motor vehicle emissions sub-
chapter. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-4 (Supp. V, 1970).
68 116 Cong. Rec. 16,105 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
64
 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c) (Supp. V, 1970) ; 116 Cong. Rec. 16,105 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1970).
66
 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 55, at 115.
66 See Currie, supra note 46, at 1087.
87 See discussion on pp. 577-79 supra.
68
 For additional insight into the ineffectiveness of the 1967 Act, see generally
OTallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act of 1957, 33 Law & Contemp. Prob. 275
(1968); Currie, supra note 46.
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cerns initial federal research efforts into the worsening problem of
noise pollution.
The most controversial provisions of the 1970 Act deal with the
controls placed upon air pollution caused by motor vehicles; these pro-
visions will be considered in detail in the succeeding discussion. How-
ever, the Act also includes numerous other far-reaching changes in the
attack on air pollution. Although this comment is intended to focus
primarily upon the provisions affecting motor vehicles, some of the
other aspects of the Act warrant mention and will be discussed.
A. The Underlying Philosophy of the Act
The 1970 Act represents a radical departure in legislative approach
to the problem of air pollution. Rather than following the past proce-
dure of establishing air pollution standards commensurate with existing
technological feasibility,8° Congress has shifted to a policy which forces
technology to catch up with the newly promulgated standards. This shift
in legislative approach can be seen as emerging in the Senate Committee
Report on the 1967 Act, and as attaining fruition in Senator Muskie's
statement introducing the 1970 Act. The Committee Report on the 1967
Act cautioned that:
Considerations of technology and economic feasibility,
while important in helping to develop alternative plans and
schedules for achieving goals of air quality, should not be
used to mitigate against protection of the public health and
welfare."
The following excerpt from Senator Muskie's remarks introducing the
Senate version of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 crystallizes this
rationale, and epitomizes the underlying philosophy of the 1970 Act:
The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of
technological or economic judgments—or even to be limited
by what is or appears to be technologically or economically
feasible. Our responsibility is to establish what the public
interest requires to protect the health of persons. This may
mean that people and industries will be asked to do what
seems to be impossible at the present time. But if health is to
be protected, these challenges must be met °t
The 1970 Act could conceivably force automobile manufacturers,
and other industries as well, either to reduce harmful emissions drasti-
cally, or to cease operating their plants." The essential thrust of the new
69 42 U.S.C. II 1857f-1(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
70 116 Cong. Rec. 16,091 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
71 Id.
72 Senator Muskie advised the Senate that:
Detroit has told the nation that Americans cannot live without the auto-
mobile.
This legislation would tell Detroit that if that is the case, they must make
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Act is to establish 1975 deadlines for the adoption and enforcement of
national air quality standards adequate to protect the public health and
applicable to all industries. A newly created federal agency, the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA), has assumed from the Depart-
ment of HEW all responsibilities and powers granted under the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970.73
B. Provisions Affecting Stationary Sources of Air Pollution
1. Research Programs and Funding
The 1970 Act continues the emphasis upon research and grants
reflected in the 1967 Act,74
 which accelerated research relating to all
types of combustible fuels, and to motor vehicles. The 1970 Act pro-
vides increased emphasis upon research programs designed to': (a) re-
move potential pollutants from fuels prior to combustion;" (b) develop
improved methods of controlling emissions from the evaporation of
fuels ; 7a (c) improve knowledge of the effects of air pollution on health,
and on all elements of the environment;" and (d) develop low emission
an automobile with which Americans can live.
Id. at 16,092.
78 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 tit. IV. § 15; 116 Cong. Rec. 16,107 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 1970). This provision was offered as an amendment on the Senate floor. For
discussion preceding its adoption by the Senate, see 116 Cong. Rec. 16,217 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 1970). The Reorganization Plan effecting this transfer of responsibilities and
powers from HEW to the new Environmental Protection Agency became law on
October 3, 1970. CCH Clean Air & Water News, No. 41, at 2 (Oct. 9, 1970). The new
agency is charged with the administration and enforcement of all the federal anti-pollution
programs. In September, 1970, there were an estimated 90 to 100 federal programs and
agencies concerned with environmental pollution. 49 Cong. Dig. 198 (1970). Reorganiza-
tion was clearly needed to coordinate efforts and eliminate needless multiplication of
expenses. The Department of HEW had grown too large and had become too burdened
with other programs to administer the fight on pollution effectively, as illustrated by
its record under the 1967 Act. See discussion on pp. 577-79 supra. As a result of the Re-
organization Plan, the EPA will absorb the Federal Water Quality Administration from the
Department of the Interior; the National Air Pollution Control Administration (NAPCA)
from the Department of HEW; the Pesticides Registration Authority from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture; and numerous other smaller federal agencies. The Environmental
Protection Agency is not to be confused with the other major federal pollution agency,
the Council on Environmental Quality, an advisory board without enforcement powers
which is primarily responsible for advising the President on environmental pollution
policy matters. Boston Globe, Nov. 7, 1970, at 38, col. 2.
74 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 H 103-05. The 1967 Act had authorized appro-
priations of $170 million for the three-year period from 1968 through 1970. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857b-1(c) (Supp. V, 1970). The 1970 Act authorizes $350 million for research on air
pollution in relation to fuels and low-emission alternatives to the existing internal com-
bustion engine, and a total of $1.1 billion to implement the Act for the three-year
period from 1971 through 1973. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §§ 103, 104, 212, 316, 403.
Most of the funds authorized under the 1967 Act, however, were never expended. See the
statistics in notes 49 and 50 supra.
75 Id. § 104(a)(1)(13).
75 Id.	 104(a)(1)(C).
77
 Id. § 103(f)(1)(A), (B). Section 103(f)(3) of the Act also authorizes the EPA
to contract with private industry for research on the effects of air pollution, and provides
$15 million for such contracts.
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alternatives to the internal combustion engine." In addition, the Act
authorizes funds for the development of methods to produce new or
synthetic low-emission fuels for both stationary and moving fuel-
burning needs." Most importantly, the 1970 Act continues the policy,
established in the 1967 Act, of authorizing the EPA Administrator to
grant considerable federal assistance to the states to establish or im-
prove regional air quality programs."
2. Air Quality Control Regions: Criteria, Standards and Goals
The 1970 Act retains the concept of federal "air quality control
regions" as the geographical subdivisions of the air pollution control
effort. The EPA Administrator is required to designate additional re-
gions within ninety days after enactment of the Act." Once all the
air quality control regions covering the continental United States are
established, the Act requires that the Administrator publish in the
Federal Register, within thirty days of enactment, additional air
quality criteria and information on techniques for the control of newly
evaluated pollutants." Section 108 requires the EPA Administrator to
begin publishing lists of harmful pollutants within thirty days of the
enactment of the Act, and requires him to issue air quality criteria for
pollutants so listed within twelve months of the date of publication."
EPA reports on control techniques will be released to the states simul-
taneous to the publication of new air quality criteria. 84
 The states can
then develop programs to implement "ambient air quality" standards"
78 Id. §§ 104(a)(2)(B), (C), 212.
79 Id. § 104(a)(1)(E).
80 Section 105(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 authorizes the EPA Ad-
ministrator to provide up to two-thirds of the costs of "planning, developing, establishing
or improving" and up to one-half of the cost of maintaining state air quality control
programs serving a single municipality; or up to 75% of planning costs and up to 60%
of the maintenance costs for programs serving two or more municipalities. The amounts
provided under the 1967 Act were 67% and 50%, respectively. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c(a)(1)
(Supp. V, 1970). Under § 106 of the 1970 Act, the Administrator is authorized to provide
one hundred percent of planning program costs for two years, and 75% of such costs
thereafter, for the purpose of developing implementation plans for any interstate air
quality control region comprised of several states. While the increased funds made avail-
able to the states to assist them in establishing and maintaining intrastate pollution
control program is salutary, some less prosperous states will still have serious financial
difficulties in establishing and operating viable pollution control programs. Such states
should receive more, if not all, of the necessary funds from Congress. Illustrative of states
which might be unable to establish an on-going pollution control program even with
the aid authorized under the 1970 Act is the near-bankrupt state of New Hampshire.
See Boston Globe, Nov. 26, 1970, at 3, col. 5.
Si Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 107(c).
82 Id. § 108(a). See discussion in note 33 and accompanying text supra.
85 Id. § 108(a)(2).
84
 Id. § 108(b).
85
 The Senate Committee Report accompanying the Senate version of the Act
defined "ambient air quality" as follows:
Ambient air quality is sufficient to protect the health of [particularly
sensitive citizens such as emphysematics] whenever there is an absence of
adverse effect on the health . . . from exposure to the ambient air. An ambient
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on a regional basis, if they have not already done so under the 1967
Act." The EPA Administrator will also issue periodic reports on air
pollutant control techniques to assist the states' control efforts."
An important change in the 1970 Act requires the EPA, and not
each individual state, to establish "primary" and "secondary" national
air quality standards covering those pollutants for which air quality
criteria have been issued.88
 The states must then implement, as a mini-
mum, the federally-designated national standards, although each state
does have authority to promulgate stricter standards if it wishes to do
so." A major flaw in the 1967 Act derived from the fact that the states
air quality standard, therefore, should be the maximum permissible ambient air
level of an air pollution agent or class of such agents (related to a period of
time) which 'will protect the health of any group of the population.
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970). This decidedly general definition
attempted to convey the basic premise that national standards must be such that the
attainment and maintenance thereof would protect the health of all persons. The House-
Senate Conference Committee, however, modified the Senate definition of an ambient air
quality standard by dividing standards into "primary" and "secondary" standards.
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 109(a). Primary standards are defined as those
"requisite to protect the public health." Id. 109(b)(1). Secondary standards are those
"requisite to protect the public welfare." Id. § 109(b)(2). The Administrator is required
to establish two standards for each pollutant, one based upon public health, the other
upon public welfare, both of which the states must then implement in their control
programs. The distinction between "public health" and "public welfare" is an economic
one. Section 302(h) of the 1970 Act indicates that:
All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects
on soils, water, crops, vegetation, man-made materials, animals, wildlife, weather,
visibility and climate damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to
transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort
and well-being.
Primary standards must be stringent enough to protect the health of even the most
sensitive citizens, as indicated by the quotation from the Senate Committee Report supra.
Secondary standards, it would appear, must be even more stringent in order to protect
virtually everything other than public health. Presumably, one air quality standard for
each pollutant, as stringent as technologically possible, would have been sufficient to
protect both public health and public proprietary or other interests from the effects of
air pollution. If the secondary standards were to be interpreted as being less stringent
than the primary standards, and the Act were to be interpreted as allowing the states
to enforce the secondary rather than the primary standards, then clearly public health
considerations would be frustrated and rendered subservient to proprietary considerations.
But if, as is more logical, the secondary standards are to be tougher than the primary
standards, the result would be the recognition that standards adequate to protect health
may be inadequate to protect everything else. For example, a pollutant such as particu-
late matter, complying with a "public health" standard, could continue to be extremely
destructive to animals, or could adversely affect weather, visibility, personal comfort,
etc. For this type of a pollutant, then, a stricter standard than one based upon public
health would be needed. That secondary standards are meant to be stricter may also be
inferred from the fact that the Act allows additional time for states to implement them.
Section 110 of the Act, discussed infra, requires immediate implementation of primary
standards, but requires that secondary standards be implemented only within "a
reasonable time." § 110(a)(2 )(A)(ii)•
80 See discussion on p. 576 supra.
87 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 108(c), (d).
Be Id. § 109(a).
89 Id. § 116.
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were left to shift for themselves in promulgating air quality standards
for each region. Lacking in expertise, manpower and funds, and pres-
sured by the formidable political influence wielded by large tax-paying
industries, the states were in no position to establish such standards.
Consequently, few states had complied with the 1967 Act by the time
the 1970 Act was passed." Although the states now have the benefit
of federally-established ambient air quality standards, they still remain
primarily responsible for implementing and enforcing these standards
within their borders.°1
The 1970 Act also provides for "new source" performance stan-
dards, designed to insure that newly built stationary pollution sources
will be designed, built, equipped, operated and maintained so as to
reduce pollution emissions to a minimum.92
 The 1970 Act recognizes
that pollution agents and combinations of agents fall into three general
categories:
1. those emitted from stationary or moving sources and
which are detectable;"
2. those designated as hazardous to the health of persons;"
and
3. those pollutants which are not emitted in large quantities,
which are not detectable with available technology, but
which are a serious threat to health."
99 See discussion on p. 580 supra. While it is lamentable, it is not surprising that
only ten states' standards and no state implementation plans had been approved by HEW
as of late September, 1970. In any event, the states should benefit greatly by being
required to adopt, as a minimum, the federally promulgated air quality standards.
91 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 0 107(a).
92 Section 111 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 provides the EPA Adminis-
trator power to prohibit and to suspend construction and operation of new stationary
sources of pollution, unless they comply with the pollution control standards promulgated
by the EPA Administrator pursuant to 0 111. New stationary sources expected to be
subjected to the provisions of § 111 include: cement manufacturing, coal cleaning
operations, coke by-product manufacturing, cotton ginning, ferroalloy plants, grain
milling and handling operations, gray iron foundries, iron and steel operations, nitric
acid manufacturing, nonferrous metallurgical operations, petroleum refining, phosphate
manufacturing, phosphoric acid manufacturing, pulp and paper mill operations, rendering
plants, sulfuric acid manufacturing, soap and detergent manufacturing, municipal
incinerators and steam electric power plants. 116 Cong. Rec., 16,108 (daily ed. Sept. 21,
1970).
93 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 I§ 108, 109.
94 Id.	 112. This is a new section, devoted exclusively to emission standards for
"hazardous air pollutants." Such a pollutant is one "to which no ambient air quality
standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator may cause, or
contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or Incapacitat-
ing reversible, illness." Id. § 112(a)(1). In short, this refers to a type of pollutant so
dangerous to health that the EPA Administrator, after appropriate procedures, may
prohibit it entirely or severely restrict it. Pollutants expected to be subject to this section
include asbestos, cadmium, mercury and beryllium. S. Rep. No. 96-1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1970).
00 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 112 sets forth the procedures to be followed
to control those substances which may eventually be designated "hazardous agents,"
discussed In note 94 supra, or subject to the ambient air quality standards (as carbon
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Enforcement of the standards set for categories (2) and (3) is vested
in the EPA Administrator, although he may delegate this power to the
states under certain circumstances." Enforcement of the standards
governing category (1) rests primarily with the states," with inter-
vention power reserved to the EPA Administrator for pollution originat-
ing from stationary sources;" and enforcement of the standards
applicable to pollution emanating from new motor vehicles rests pri-
marily with the Administrator."
3. Implementation Plans and Enforcement
a. Plans. The mere existence of air quality standards, or of spe-
cific pollution emission standards, whether national or regional, will
have little effect on air quality without effective implementation through
a strict control program. Accordingly, the implementation phase of the
1970 Actl" is vital to attaining the air quality goals sought to be
achieved through the Act. Section 110 of the 1970 Act outlines the
procedures for the implementation of state control programs. First,
the EPA Administrator must promulgate national primary and second-
ary ambient air quality standards for known pollutants."' Within nine
months thereafter, the state must submit its implementation plan to
the EPA for approval.'" Before the state adopts an implementation
plan, it must hold public hearingsm so that the residents of the affected
area may participate in setting air quality standards for their region.'"
Within four months of such submission, the Administrator shall approve
or disapprove the implementation plan or each portion thereof.' The
monoxide now is), depending upon the criteria report for each such substance. Included as
pollutants under this section are arsenic, chlorine gas, hydrogen chloride, copper,
manganese, nickel, vanadium, zinc, barium, boron, chromium, selenium, pesticides and
radioactive substances. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).
00
 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 112(d) (1).
97 Id. §§ 107, 110, 111.
98
 Sections 113 and .303 define the intervention powers of the Administrator. For a
discussion of federal enforcement power regarding intrastate and interstate pollution from
stationary sources see discussion on pp. 589-91 infra.
99
 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 202, 211(c)(4), 233. The general federal
preemption provision contained in the 1967 Act was not changed by the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970. See 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (Supp. V, 1970).
100 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110.
rot Id. § 109.
toa Id
. § 110(a)(1).
108 Id.
104 The 1970 Senate Hearings recognized the importance and the right of the public
to be heard at each step of the pollution abatement process, from establishing air quality
standards and emission levels for pollutants, to citizens' court action to compel their
enforcement. See the discussion of the important new citizen suits provision under the
1970 Act on pp. 612-16 infra.
199 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110(a)(2). A plan submitted to the EPA by
a state will not be approved by the Administrator unless it includes the following
measures: provision to achieve air quality standards within three years from the date
of implementation of the plan; specific emission standards for pollutants, and schedules
of compliance; effective procedures to control pollution sources, including land use and
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Administrator is required to impose an implementation plan, or a por-
tion thereof, upon a state if: (1) the state fails to submit an imple-
mentation plan for any national ambient air quality primary or second-
ary standard within the time prescribed; or (2) the plan, or any part
of it, submitted by the state is determined by the Administrator not to
conform to federal requirements; or (3) the state fails, within sixty
days after notification by the Administrator, to revise an implementa-
tion plan as required by section 110(a) (2) (H). 10° IfI the state failed to
hold the required public hearings regarding the implementation plan,
the Administrator shall provide an opportunity for a hearing within
that state. Within six months after the date required for submission
of the implementation plan, the Administrator shall design a plan for
a state, unless the state has adopted and submitted a plan acceptable
to the Administrator."' The state must then enforce this implementa-
tion plan according to the 1970 Act.
Provision is made for a state to obtain extensions of the timetable
deadlines in connection with submitting implementation plans to the
Administrator. At his discretion, the Administrator may grant a state
an extension of up to eighteen months to submit a plan or portion
thereof which implements a national secondary ambient air quality
standard."' In addition, upon application of a governor of a state at
the time of the submission of any plan implementing a national
primary ambient air quality standard, the Administrator may extend
by two years the period within which a state must achieve compliance
with a primary standard."' It should be noted that a state may adopt
air quality standards more stringent than those proposed by the EPA. 11°
If the state has adopted an implementation control program and later
comes to the conclusion that a particular polluter will be unable to
air and surface transportation controls; a procedure for review, prior to construction or
modification, of the location of new stationary sources of pollution; requirements for
installation of monitoring equipment and periodic pollution reports by owners or
operators of stationary sources of pollution; and provision for periodic pollution
inspection and testing of motor vehicles. Id.
100 id. § 110(c).
107 Id.
108 Id. § 110(b).
100 Id. § '110(c). Under this section compliance with primary standards is normally
required within a three-year period. The two-year extension will be granted to the state
if the Administrator determines that:
(A) One or more emission sources (or classes of moving sources) are unable to
comply with the requirements of such plan which implement such primary
standard because the necessary technology or other alternatives are not avail-
able or will not be available soon enough to permit compliance within such three
year period, and
(13) the State has considered and applied as a part of its plan reasonably avail-
able alternative means of attaining such primary standard and has justifiably
concluded that attainment of such primary standard within the three years
cannot be achieved.
Id. § 110(e)(1).
110 Id. § 116.
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achieve compliance at least with the federally-promulgated minimum
standards within the three-year deadline established under Section
110,111
 the Act permits the governor of the state to petition the EPA
Administrator for a one-year extension.'" However, this extension may
be granted only if the Administrator finds that:
1. Good faith efforts were made to comply with the require-
ments of the implementation plan;
2. The source of pollution is unable to comply with these
requirements because the necessary technology or other
alternative methods of control are not available or were
not available for a sufficient period of time;
3. Available alternative operating procedures and interim
control measures have served to reduce the impact of such
source on the public health; and
4. That the continued operation of such source is essential
to national security or to the public health or welfare.'"
It was the intent of the Senate Committee than an extension should be
granted only as a "last alternative."'" No provision is made for a re-
newal of the one-year extension.115 The decision of the Administrator is
subject to judicial review by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the circuit
which includes the state in question.'"
Under the 1970 Act it is conceivable that some thirty-nine months
could elapse before a state has a program to implement secondary
(public welfare) standards,'" and some six years could elapse after
111
 Id. § 110(a) (2) (A) (i).
112 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110(f). Consequently, a state could first obtain
a two-year extension of the three-year deadline for compliance with primary air quality
standards, established under § 110(e), and then later could obtain still another one-year
extension if a pollution source within the state has difficulty meeting the standards.
Accordingly, a total of six years could elapse, following the EPA Administrator's accep-
tance of the state's plan, before the state would have to comply with its primary (public
health) air quality standards.
112
 Id. § 110(0(1)(A), (B), (C), (D).
114 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970).
115
 The Senate version of section 110, dealing with implementation of control pro-
grams by the states, had provided for renewable one-year extensions during which a state,
or more precisely, polluters in the state, could have procrastinated to avoid compliance
with the program, to the detriment of the health and welfare of residents of the state.
The inclusion of the provision allowing unlimited renewable one-year extensions was a
flaw in the Senate bill which the House-Senate Conference averted. But because a state
can apply for a two-year extension of the three-year deadline at the time it submits its
implementation plan (see note 109 supra), the states are already assured of a minimum
five-year period during which compliance with federal air quality standards may be post-
poned. This delay period may be increased by an additional year if a given source of
pollution within the state encounters difficulty in complying with federal requirements.
See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
118 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110(f) (2). The court has jurisdiction to affirm
or set aside the Administrator's decision in whole or in part. Id.
117 A state has nine months after the Administrator promulgates primary and
secondary national air quality standards to submit an implementation plan to the
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acceptance of a state plan, before the state must achieve its primary
(public health) standards." 8 A major weakness of the 1967 Act—the
incorporation of inordinately time-consuming procedures—does not ap-
pear to have been remedied in the 1970 Act. Successful enforcement of
pollution laws depends upon the rapidity with which uncooperative
polluters are enjoined or otherwise penalized. The pyramid of exten-
sions permitted under the 1970 Act severely weakens its effectiveness.
The time period for implementation of state plans should have been
limited to twelve months at the maximum since the present provisions
will only encourage procrastination through extensive procedural delay.
The allowance of these procedural delays is a serious flaw in the 1970
Act.
b. Enforcement. Under the 1967 Act enforcement procedures
were cumbersome and basically ineffective."° As noted earlier, state
and local governments did not adequately enforce the standards, and
federal enforcement power was limited essentially to interstate prob-
lems.'" As a result, no level of government implemented the Act to its
full potential. Accordingly, important changes in the enforcement pro-
cedures were included in the 1970 Act. State and local governments
retain primary responsibility and authority to enforce the air quality
standards within their respective regions. But federal enforcement
power has been expanded to insure that the states do their job."'
Eliminated are the 1967 Act's conference and hearing requirements
before federal abatement proceedings could begin.' Now the EPA
Administrator can issue orders requiring abatement action by state
Administrator. Id. I 110(a)(1). The latter has lour months within which to approve
or disapprove the submitted plan. Id. I 110(a)(2). At his discretion, the Administrator
may grant an eighteen month extension for the submission of a plan which implements a
secondary air quality standard. Id. 4 110(b). If the plan when finally submitted is not
acceptable, the Administrator must give the state two months to revise the plan. Id.
I 110(c) (3). If the state fails to revise the plan, the Administrator is then given another
six months after the expiration of the final date of submission to impose a plan upon a
state. Id. Thus, thirty-nine months could elapse before a state even has a control program
to implement.
118 See note 112 supra.
119 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1234 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]. The ineffectiveness of the procedures calling
for a preliminary conference, then a public hearing, and finally resort to the courts is
illustrated by the following example. The first air pollution enforcement action was
instituted by the federal government in 1965 under the 1963 Act, against a chicken
processing plant in Maryland. A conference was held in 1965, a public hearing in 1967.
Suit was finally brought in the federal district court in 1969, and an appeal was taken to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The plant was not finally shut down until May, 1970-5 years
after the abatement action started. No other enforcement action has proceeded beyond
the conference stage, and no enforcement action was ever taken under the 1967 Act. 116
Cong. Rec. 16,104 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
120 See discussion on p. 579 supra.
121 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 f 113.
122 42 U.S.C. § 1857d (Supp. V, 1970).
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agencies,' or the Administrator may directly order the polluter in
question to cease violation of an emission standard within thirty days. 124
Whenever the Administrator determines that any person is violat-
ing any requirement of a state's implementation plan, the Administrator
shall notify both the violator and the state involved. If the violation
extends beyond the thirtieth day from the date of his notification, the
Administrator may issue an order requiring the violator to comply with
the requirements of the plan, or he may bring a civil action for appro-
priate relief, including a permanent or temporary injunction.'" If, on
the other hand, the Administrator finds that violations are so wide-
spread that they appear to result from the failure of a state to enforce
its plan effectively, he shall first notify the state. If the failure extends
beyond the thirtieth day of his notice, the Administrator shall give
public notice of the situation so that interested citizen groups may also
become involved. During the period beginning with such notice and
ending when the state satisfies the Administrator that it will enforce its
plan, the Administrator may enforce any requirement of a state's im-
plementation plan with respect to any person by issuing an abatement
order or by commencing a civil action for appropriate relief, including
injunctive relief.'"
The Administrator may require stationary sources of pollution to
install and maintain equipment to monitor levels of pollutant emis-
sions,127 and to furnish upon request reports and records showing
compliance with the established air quality standards.' Under the
122 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 113(a)(2).
124 Id. § 113(a)(1) .
126
 Id. 1113(a)(1), (b).
126 Id.
	 113(a)(2). Despite the fact that the Administrator is now able to order
violators directly and to institute direct injunctive and criminal proceedings, the require-
ment that he must wait thirty days before he can affirmatively abate the violation repre-
sents a weakening of a more effective Senate version of more immediate federal
enforcement powers. In the Senate version of the bill, H.R. 17255, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Amendments of 1970], § 116 empowered the Ad-
ministrator to require that a polluter cease his violation within 72 hours of the issuance
of his order. Also, the language of the Senate version was mandatory. The language in
§ 113 of the Clean Air Amendments is merely discretionary. In discussing the Senate
version, dealing with the powers of the Administrator to require abatement of pollution
violations within 72 hours, the Senate Committee Report indicated that the judgment of
the Administrator should not even be reviewable:
In view of the need for streamlined and expedited enforcement procedures,
the committee intends that the judgment of the [Administrator] in this instance
shall not be reviewable.
S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1970). Section 113 of the Act as enacted
does not provide for immediate relief, and the Administrator's order is reviewable. See
discussion of appeal provisions on pp. 591-93 infra. Clearly the 72-hour provision is
preferable, as it would spare the public from an added month of harmful pollution
before the polluter must cease. But although section 113 imposes a thirty-day bar to
administrative action, emergency powers enabling the Administrator to act to obtain im-
mediate abatement of serious violations of stationary or moving source emission standards
are available to him under § 303 of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.
127 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 1114(a)(1).
128 Id.
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1967 Act, sanctions for non-compliance with the Act's provisions were
extremely weak. Upon conviction under the 1970 Act, polluters who
knowingly violate any emission standard or standard of performance
are to be fined $25,000 per day of violation and may be imprisoned for
one year. These penalties are doubled for conviction of a second of-
fense."' Tampering with monitoring devices and failure to submit
truthful records and reports of emission levels may be punished by a
$10,000 fine and six months in prison.'" Finally, if the EPA Adminis-
trator and state and local agencies fail in their enforcement responsi-
bilities, private citizens are granted the right to seek enforcement action
under the important citizen suits provision of the Act."'
4. Provisions for Appeal132
Judicial review is available to any person (including alleged pol-
luters), agency, or private citizen wishing to challenge any promulgated
standard, regulation, implementation plan, or other decision of the EPA
Administrator relating to stationary sources of pollution. 133 For the
purpose of national uniformity, the 1970 Act requires that judicial
review of any federally promulgated air quality standard, prohibition,
or emission standard must be sought in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.134 Review of a state implementation plan,
including any emission requirement approved by the Administrator,
may be had in the federal court of appeals for the circuit in which the
state is located."' In either situation, the parties may seek review by
the United States Supreme Court. The Administrator is given power to
issue subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of relevant papers, books and documents, and he may
administer oaths."'
The availability of judicial review for administratively developed
120 Id. § 113(c)(1).
180 Id. § 113(c)(2). The penalties provided under the 1970 Act are decidedly severe.
Whether they are severe enough to deter violations, and whether the EPA Administrator
will actually use them, remain to be seen. Under the 1967 Act the Secretary of HEW
had no power to seek penalties against stationary source polluters. Although he did have
the power to impose penalties in the case of moving sources of pollution under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857f-4, this power was never exercised. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 380.
131 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304. See discussion on pp. 612-16 infra.
182 Discussion of the provisions for judicial review will be limited here to review of
administrative standards and decisions relating to stationary source pollution. Judicial
review in the context of automobile emission standards and decisions will be discussed
infra, at pp. 616-21.
188 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 307(b)(1).
134 Id,
185 Id.
180 Id. § 307(a) (1). Except for emission data which is available to the public, the
Administrator shall consider documents submitted by alleged polluters confidential if the
latter can satisfactorily demonstrate to the Administrator that, if made public, the
information would divulge trade secrets or secret processes of the owner or operator.
Id. Failure to produce subpoenaed information would lead to a contempt of court
citation. Id.
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and promulgated anti-pollution standards has been the subject of much
recent litigation.'" The courts have held that even in matters committed
by statute to administrative discretion, "preclusion of judicial review
is not lightly to be inferred, however; it requires a showing of clear
evidence of legislative intent." 198 The test adopted by the courts to
determine standing to request review of administrative acts is whether
the person requesting relief will be "adversely affected by" the action
in question.'a9 In the area of environmental standards, the courts have
granted standing to those being regulated as well as to those who seek
"to protect the public interest in the proper administration of a regula-
tory system enacted for their benefit,"14° because such standards clearly
affect both the financial interests of the polluter and the health interests
of the public. Any standard promulgated by the Administrator and any
enforcement action taken by him may be subjected to judicial review at
the instance of any interested person."' However, such review must be
sought within thirty days of the Administrator's action 1 42 Under the
Senate version of the judicial review provision the filing of a petition
for review would not have operated as a stay of compliance with the
standard or decision in question, unless the person appealing could
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits and
that the interest of the public would not be harmed by the stay 148
 The
Administrator's promulgations and decisions also enjoyed a rebuttable
presumption of correctness.'" The burden of persuasion thus rested
upon the person seeking the review. The Clean Air Amendments of
1970, as finally enacted, are silent on both the stay of compliance and
on the presumption of correctness. Section 110, however, does indicate
that a governor may apply for and receive a one-year extension of
compliance for a stationary source, if it can be demonstrated at a hear-
137 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970), involving standards for the pesticide DDT. (Plaintiff's brief for this case, and
discussion thereon, are found in 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 622-816);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), involving regulations for use of farmlands under
the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(1967), involving regulations requiring the proper labeling of prescription drugs.
188 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
180 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970) ; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
140 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir.
1970); S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40-42 (1970).
141 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 1 307.
142 Id. It is important to note that if any interested person fails to appeal any
action of the Administrator regarding the establishment of emission standards for pollu-
tants, or the approval of state implementation plans, within thirty days of such action,
the Administrator's action shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal
proceedings for enforcement. The person will in effect have waived his right to attack
the fairness of emission standards or implementation plans If he does not appeal them
within thirty days of their promulgation. Id. 307(b) (1), (2).
143 Senate Amendments of 1970, supra note 126, 1 308.
144 Id.
592
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
ing before the Administrator that the polluter meets certain require-
ments.'" The findings of the Administrator regarding the requirements
"shall be sustained if based upon a fair evaluation of the entire record
at such hearing."'" It is not clear from the language of the 1970 Act,
however, whether a polluter may appeal to the Administrator directly,
without intervention by the governor, whether he may obtain a stay of
compliance during his appeal, and where the burden of proof lies. It is
to be hoped that the intent of the Senate version will be followed and
that the filing of a petition appealing the Administrator's decision will
not operate as a stay of compliance with the standard in question.
C. The Provisions Governing Motor Vehicle Pollution
The Report on the 1970 Act by the Senate Committee on Public
Works indicated that continued reliance on only gradual reductions of
automotive emissions would make achievement of the ambient air
quality standards impossible within the deadlines established under
Title I of the 1970 Act."' In order to achieve those standards, and to
protect the public health, the emission standards originally projected
by HEW under the 1967 Act for 1980,must now be met by 1975. 148 The
145 The
 governor, on behalf of the stationary-source or moving-source polluter, in
order to obtain a one-year extension, must demonstrate, prior to the date such source was
required to begin compliance with the standard, that (a) good faith efforts were made to
achieve compliance; (b) the technology was not available to permit compliance; (c)
interim control measures will guard the public health; (d) the continued operation of
such source is essential to national security or to the public health or welfare. Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 § 110(f)(1).
140 Id. § 110(f)(2)(B).
147 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1970).
148 The following table illustrates the proposed automobile emission standards
established by the Secretary of HEW pursuant to the 1967 Act as compared with the
standards established by Congress in the 1970 Act. The figures represent the comparative
emission levels of new motor vehicles for the four pollutants for which air quality
criteria have been issued.
AUTO EMISSIONS*
[All figures in grams per mile]
Carbon
Hydro-	 Mon-	 Nitric Partic-
carbons	 oxide	 Oxides	 ulates
New Test New Test Old Test Old Test
Uncontrolled	 [pre-1968 vehicles] 	 14.6 116.3 4.0 0.4
1970 standard [pursuant to 1967 Act] 	 2.9 37.0
Proposed 1975 standard [pursuant to 1967 Act] 0.5 11.0 0.9 0.1
Proposed 1980 standard [pursuant to 1967 Act] 0.25 4.7 0.4 0.03
The standards required by the 1970 Act [90%
reduction of 1970 standard] 	 0.29 3.7 0.4 0.04
* Source: 116 Cong. Rec. 16,113 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
In health effects these pollutants may cause cancer, headaches, dizziness, nausea, metabolic
and respiratory diseases, and impairment of mental processes.
Studies show that exposure to 10 parts per million of carbon monoxide
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Public Works Committee determined that the establishment of motor
vehicle emission standards was a policy decision so vital to public
health that it should be made by the full Congress rather than by an
administrative agency.'" Accordingly, in the 1970 Act, Congress estab-
lished automotive emission standards.
1. Establishment of the Standards
a. Prescription of the Standards. Under the 1967 Act standards
were set by the Department of HEW on the basis of economic and
technological feasibility.'" Under the 1970 Act, the standards are based
upon the levels required to protect the public health; existing technol-
ogy was not considered relevant.' Title II of the Act authorizes the
EPA Administrator to regulate sources of pollution which move in
interstate commerce, or which are dangerous to the public health and
welfare. More specifically, Section 202 (a) (1) of the Act authorizes the
EPA to set standards of emission for all known pollutants discharged
by any class of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, except
as provided in Section 202 (b), discussed below. Such standards shall
be applicable to the vehicles and engines for their useful life, 152 and they
must be based upon the degree of control necessary to protect the public
health and welfare, whether such vehicles and engines are designed as
complete systems or incorporate devices to prevent or control pollu-
tion."' Under another section of the Act the Administrator is also au-
thorized to establish emission standards for aircraft and aircraft
engines.'" Any standards so prescribed for new motor vehicles and
aircraft shall take effect after such a period as the Administrator finds
necessary to permit the development and application of the requisite
technology. 155
The heart of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 is Section 202 (b),
which establishes the maximum levels of new motor vehicle emissions
permissible by 1975 and 1976. This section requires that exhaust emis-
sions of hydrocarbons (HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) from 1975
model yearm passenger vehicles and engines be reduced to levels ninety
for approximately 8 hours may dull mental performance . . . In heavy traffic
situations, levels of 70, 80, or 100 parts per million are not uncommon for short
periods.
116 Cong. Rec. 16,218 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
140 116 Cong. Rec. 16,218 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
150 42 U.S.C. § 1857f.-1(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
151 116 Cong. Rec. 16,091 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
152 "Useful life" for light duty vehicles and engines (passenger vehicles) is defined
as being a period of use of five years or 50,000 miles (or the equivalent), whichever
occurs first. For any other type of motor vehicle or engine the same definition applies,
unless the Administrator determines that a period of use of greater duration is appro-
priate. Clear Air Amendments of 1970 § 202(d).
165
 Id. § 202(a)(1).
154 Id. § 231.
155 Id. §§ 202(a)(2), 231(b).
155 The term "model year" is defined as the manufacturer's annual production period
594
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OP 1970
percent below those established by the Secretary of HEW for 1970
model vehicles pursuant to the 1967 Act. Exhaust emissions of oxides
of nitrogen (NOx) from 1976 model year vehicles and engines must
also be reduced to levels ninety percent below the level of emissions of
1971 model vehicles. 167 The Administrator must report annually to
Congress, beginning on July 1, 1971, with respect to the extent and
progress of efforts being made to develop the technology necessary to
achieve the 1975 and 1976 standards. He may also recommend addi-
tional congressional action necessary to achieve the purposes of the
1970 Act.168 To assist the Administrator, the National Academy of Sci-
ences will conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of the tech-
nological feasibility of meeting the automotive emission standards
prescribed under section 202(b). 169 In the event that the automobile
manufacturers cannot achieve compliance with the emission standards
for HC and CO by 1975, and for NOx by 1976, provision is made for a
single, one-year extension.'°°
A great deal of controversy was engendered by the fact that spe-
cific hearings were not held by the Senate Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution to determine whether the automakers would be able to
comply with the 1975 emission standards. Instead, the Subcommittee
used other evidence at its disposal to determine that the standards
decided upon were both essential and achievable."' In June, 1970, a
(as determined by the Administrator) which includes January 1 of the calendar year. If
a manufacturer has no annual production period, the term "model year" will mean the
calendar year. And, to assure that vehicles manufactured before the beginning of a model
year were not manufactured for the purposes of circumventing compliance with the federal
standards, the Administrator may prescribe regulations defining "model year" in a
manner other than in the foregoing definition. Id. * 202(b) (3).
167 See the table in note 148 supra. The automobile is presently the single greatest
polluter in our society. Its emissions are responsible for an estimated 60% of the nation's
air pollution. Moreover, the rate of increase in the number of motor vehicles on the road
is twice that of the U.S. birth rate. The U.S. population increases by about 6,000 persons
per day. Motor vehicles are increasing at the rate of 12,000 per day. 116 Cong. Rec.
16,109 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970). At present, there are over 100 million motor vehicles in
use in the U.S. Id. at 16,093.
158 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 { 202(6)(4).
185
 Id. § 202(c). The National Academy of Sciences is required to submit semi-
annual reports to the Administrator and the Congress on the progress of its study. Id.
§ 202(c) (3). The Administrator will furnish to the Academy any information which
the latter deems necessary to the study. Id. 202(c) (4),
leo Id. § 202(b)(5). Much controversy surrounded the question of the one-year
extension and whether the Administrator's decision to grant or deny such an extension
should be reviewable, See discussion on pp. 616-21 infra.
101
 See generally 116 Cong. Rec. 16,093-097 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970) for the
Senate floor debate on § 202(b). Senator Griffin of Michigan vigorously opposed the
provision, the only Senator to do so. He accused the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of playing "economic roulette" with millions of jobs. Senator Muskie, Chairman
of the Subcommittee, responded that the Committee would rather play Russian roulette
with the automakers than with the trapped inhabitants of urban America whose health
was at stake. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,096. For the reasons persuading the Subcommittee to
adopt the severe emission standards for 1975 model automobiles, and the arguments of
595
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Department of HEW reporti" concluded that the following ambient
air quality standards must be attained to insure protection of the public
health:
[Data reflected in parts per million (PPm)] 1e3
Carbon monoxide 	
 9.00 ppm/8-hour average
Photochemical oxidants 
	  0.06 ppm/1-hour average
Nitrogen dioxide
	 0  10 ppm/1-hour average
These prescribed safe levels of pollution are far below the levels cur-
rently experienced in cities such as Chicago and Los Angeles, where
air pollution levels are among the most hazardous in the nation. In
these cities the following pollution levels have been recorded:
Carbon monoxide ... 44.00 ppm/8-hour average (Chicago)
Nitrogen dioxide 0.69 ppm/1-hour average (Los An-
geles) "4
The serious problem of exhaust emissions from used vehicles
continues to be ignored by the Congress in the 1970 Act. The Senate
version of the 1970 amendments devoted an entire section of the Ace"
to this massive source of air pollution, but it failed to survive the com-
promising process of the House-Senate Conference Committee, and
thus the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 are silent on used vehicles.
The following is an analysis of the deleted section 211 of the Senate
amendments. It is submitted that the decision by Congress to ignore the
problem of used vehicles in the 1970 Act was alarmingly counter-
productive. Former section 211, or a comparable provision, should be
introduced promptly in the Ninety-Second Congress as an amendment
to the 1970 Ace"
the auto industry, see generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 893-904, 1031-
080, 1576-579, 1596, 1608-660; 116 Cong. Rec. 16,093-096 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
162 See generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 119, at 1639-645, which repro-
duces the report in its entirety.
163 Id. at 1643. See also the table in note 148 supra.
164
 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1970).
165
 Senate Amendments of 1970, supra note 126, 211. See also note 157 supra.
166
 Counsel for the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Mr. Phillip
T. Cummings, a draftsman of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, explained the
reasons which led the House-Senate Conference Committee to delete section 211 of the
Senate bill from the final version of the 1970 Act. Essentially, the conferees determined
that section 211, which provided for federal testing and certification of pollution-
control devices for used vehicles, and not for emission standards for used vehicles,
"... was not essential to the national air pollution control program;" that ". . . alterna-
tive methods to deal with pollution from used vehicles are already available to the states
and cities. For example, cities can restrict the use of motor vehicles in downtown areas,
and would be required to do so, if necessary, under Section 110 of the 1970 Amendments."
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(c) (Supp, V, 1970). See note 192 infra. "And the states can legislate
that owners install anti-air pollution devices on their used vehicles as one strategy in
attaining ambient air quality standards." California has apparently already approved
a device for the control of exhaust emissions from used motor vehicles. See note
168 infra. Apparently, the conferees also determined that the technology which
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Under the 1967 Act control of used motor vehicle air pollution was
presumably left to the states.'" Under the 1970 Act the states still
retain the authority to control emissions from used vehicles, but section
211 would have established minimum federal standards of performance
for air pollution control devices or systems to be installed on pre-1968
vehicles. Under this section, the Administrator would have certified
those anti-pollution devices meeting EPA established standards, and
once the devices were certified, the states could pass legislation requir-
ing their installation.'" The problem of implementing the federal stan-
dards of performance for such devices was left to the states because
the Senate Committee on Public Works was unable to 'develop a feasible
national system to deal with emissions from used vehicles.'"
At present there are over 100 million used vehicles on the highways
which do virtually all of the serious polluting of the air. 17° These vehi-
cles will live well beyond 1975, when the strict federal standards for new
motor vehicles take effect. The anomalous result in 1975 will be that
although the eight to nine million new vehicles sold that year 171 will
have to meet beneficially rigid national emission standards, some one
hundred and forty million used vehicles already on the road 172 will have
to meet no minimum national standards. Given the difficulties experi-
enced by the states in establishing air quality standards for stationary
sources of pollution under the 1967 Act, it is not unlikely that they will
encounter similar problems under the 1970 Act in promulgating and
enforcing standards for used motor vehicles. 173 Accordingly, tighter
would justify the establishment of federal emission standards for used vehicles has not
yet been proven effective enough to warrant the imposition of national standards on all
owners of used vehicles. Letter from Mr. Phillip T. Cummings to the Boston College
Industrial and Commercial Law Review, Feb. 16, 1971, on file in the Law Review office.
107 See discussion on pp. 576-77 supra.
108 California has already approved the first control device to meet standards for
reducing exhaust emissions from used vehicles manufactured from 1955-1965. The device
will be installed at a cost of about $50 to the vehicle owner. Mandatory use of this
system will follow once it is available on a mass basis. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 17,
1970, at 14, col, 2.
100 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
170 116 Cong. Rec. 16,093 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
171 See Id.
172 It is projected that by 1975, when the emission standards established for new
motor vehicles by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 take effect, an additional four to
five generations of new automobiles will have been produced. See id.
178 Under 209 of the 1967 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (Supp. V, 1970), the states
are precluded from establishing emission standards for new vehicles. But this section is
silent on state regulation of used motor vehicles and the writers have generally agreed
that Congress intended to leave regulation of used vehicles to the states. See generally
Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption, 68 Mich.
L. Rev. 1083 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Currie]. Section 209 of the 1967 Act was not
amended by the 1970 Act. Further, § 233 of the 1970 Act precludes the states from
regulating emissions from aircraft. But because § 202 of the 1970 Act speaks only in
terms of new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines, all classes of used motor
vehicles including buses, trucks, taxicabs and numerous other types of vehicles which
contribute substantially to air pollution, would apparently be regulated by the states.
Only California has moved affirmatively to control pollution from used vehicles. If
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controls should have been imposed upon this massive source of pollu-
tion by the 1970 Act. Minimum federal standards for used vehicles, bind-
ing upon the states, unless they desired even more severe controls, would
have been preferable. The Congress used this approach in the provisions
dealing with air pollution emanating from stationary sources, 174 and
should also have applied it to the emission standards for used vehicles.
The Congress also rejected two national plans which would have more
effectively reduced air pollution from used vehicles. The first of these
plans would have imposed a retroactive installation obligation upon the
auto manufacturers, and the second would have established a federal
subsidy program for installation of pollution-control devices on used
vehicles. 175 The salutary effect of either of these plans would have been
twofold: the public would not have had to bear the full brunt of financ-
ing technology which the automakers should have installed on the vehi-
cles in the first place; and there would have been a greater likelihood
that used motor vehicles would be equipped with pollution-control de-
vices. It is lamentable that neither plan was adopted in some form,
since used vehicles are the source of more than sixty percent of all air
pollution.'" The failure of Congress to deal more effectively with this
problem may well eviscerate the effectiveness of the entire 1970 Act.
b. State Standards and Federal Preemption. Under the 1967 Act
Congress preempted state legislative action"' by enacting emission
standards for new motor vehicles and new motor vehicle engines.'" Only
California was allowed an exemption from the federal preemption, and
thus allowed to regulate emissions from new, as well as used, vehicles.'"
Congress does not amend the 1970 Act by reinstating a provision similar to the deleted
§ 211 of the Senate version of the Act, the states should follow California's lead. See
also the discussion concerning federal preemption in the area of air pollution regulations
at pp. 598-601 infra.
174
 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110, 116. See discussion on pp. 586-89 supra.
175
 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970).
176
 116 Cong. Rec. 16,109 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
177 42 US.C. § 1857f-6a(a) (Supp. V, 1970) provided:
No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this subchapter. No State shall
require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of
emissions from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition
precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor
vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment.
178
 Under the 1967 Act a "new motor vehicle" was defined as one for which
equitable or legal title has never been transferred to an ultimate purchaser (first good
faith purchaser for purposes other than resale) ; "new motor vehicle engine" was sim-
ilarly defined. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-7 (Supp. V, 1970).
179
 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(b) (Supp. V, 1970) provided:
The Secretary shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive
application of this section to any state which has adopted standards (other than
crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless he finds
that such State does not require standards more stringent than applicable
Federal standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions or that such
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The federal emission standards issued for new vehicles were applicable
only to automobiles manufactured during or after the 1968 model
years's° This meant that used vehicles, those manufactured prior to
1968, were left to state regulations's' The federal preemption under the
1967 Act was vigorously criticized as impeding effective control of auto-
motive air pollution.' 82 The major criticisms of the preemption provi-
sion were as follows:
1. Some states suffered from more acute air pollution prob-
lems than other states and thus needed emission standards
which were stricter than the federally promulgated stan-
dards. Such states were hamstrung in not being able to
adopt more restrictive standards.'"
2. The 1967 Act did not require that the anti-pollution de-
vices installed on new motor vehicles be inspected or main-
tained in proper operating order, despite the fact that the
failure to maintain resulted in serious deterioration of
their effectiveness. 18'
3. The federally approved devices required to be installed on
new vehicles, generally failed to reduce emissions of hy-
drocarbons, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide.'"
4. The federal standards ignored completely the problem of
assisting state efforts to control used vehicle air pollu-
tion.'"
State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent
with section 18571-1(a) of this title.
California was preferentially treated essentially because it pioneered efforts in automobile
air pollution legislation antedating federal legislation. It was thus granted a "grandfather
clause" in the 1967 Act. See Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 1583 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings]. See also
Comment, 30 Ohio St. L. J. 516, 536 (1969). California retains its exemption from the
federal standards under the 1970 Act.
180 31 Fed. Reg. 5171 (1966); 33 Fed. Reg. 8306 (1968).
181 The Senate Report on the 1967 Act indicated the intent of the Congress:
While there has been a great deal of concern expressed regarding control of
new vehicles little attention has been paid to control of used vehicles, either
their emission or their use . . . Any significant advance in control of used
vehicles would result in a corresponding reduction in air pollution. These are
areas in which the States and local government can be most effective.
S. Rep. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967).
182 See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 75-84, 1212, 1236, 1365, 1583-584;
Currie, supra note 173 at 1102; Comment, Air Pollution, Pre-emption, Local Problems,
and the Constitution—Some Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1968).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently given encouragement to
a narrow reading of the preemption provision. See Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d
499, 511 (2d Cir. 1969).
188 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 1212.
184 Currie, supra note 173, at 1085.
185 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 371-72. For a good discussion of the
effects of these automotive pollutants upon health, see Currie, supra note 173, at 1084.
188 See the quotation excerpted in note 181 supra. A bill to repeal the preemption
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The 1970 Act continues the federal preemption as to new motor
vehicles, and the preemption has been extended to include aircraft and
aircraft engines as well as fuels. The Senate Committee Report indi-
cated that retention of the preemption provision was "to prevent a
multiplicity of state standards for emissions control systems on new
motor vehicles as required by section 202, or the regulation of fuels as
provided in section [211]." 1" The Committee also recognized, however,
"that there may be unusual instances when the state would have to
require a standard of emission control for a vehicle that would exceed
the controls provided by this legislation."'" Provision was therefore
made in the Senate version of the 1970 Act for states other than Cali-
fornia'" to obtain an exception to the preemption provision, but only
upon a showing that a more stringent standard was necessary and essen-
tial for the state to achieve the ambient air quality standards applicable
to regions within its jurisdiction. The Committee had intended this
waiver primarily to permit a variance to control emissions from commer-
cial vehicles.'" The House-Senate Conference rejected this waiver
provision, however, and omitted entirely any amendment to the pre-
emption provision of the 1967 Act. The states and communities retain
the authority granted under the 1967 Act to regulate or restrict the use,
operation or movement of any vehicle"' when necessary in order to
achieve compliance with national ambient air quality standards and
goals established under Title I of the 1970 Act. 102
At first blush, it would seem that the 1970 Act, in retaining the
federal preemption provision, has perpetuated a problem which en-
gendered the criticisms mentioned as having been leveled against the
1967 preemption section. Such would be the case if the federal emission
standards were so inadequate that states might be expected to seek
tougher standards in order to maintain or achieve desirable air quality
in their respective regions. However, with increasingly more stringent
federal emission standards being promulgated for the 1972, 1973 and
1974 new model vehicles,'" and with federal emission standards for
provision of the 1967 Act was introduced in the House of Representatives by Congress-
man Mikva of Illinois. H.R. 16,013, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
187 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970).
188 Id.
188 Under the 1970 Act California retains its exemption; the provision of the 1967
Act so providing was left untouched in the 1970 Act.
100 S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1970).
101 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
102 In other words, states and municipalities are free to restrict the use of motor
vehicles in sections of a city at designated hours. This practice has become common-
place in the past year in cities as large as New York City (See Boston Globe, Oct. 13,
1970, at 12, col. 1) or as small as Malden, Mass. (Id. at 9, col. 1) which have begun
to prohibit the operation of motor vehicles on certain streets at specific times. See also
Newsweek, Jan. 4, 1971, at 42.
123 Revised regulations, including improved test procedures which should reduce
pollution from new vehicles in the 1972, 1973 and 1974 model years, were published in
the Federal Register on November 10, 1970, by the Secretary of HEW. The regulations
are designed to reduce emissions of exhaust hydrocarbons by 80% and of carbon
600
THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970
new 1975 vehicles being cut by ninety percent,' the likelihood that
the states would desire even stricter emission standards for new vehicles
seems remote. The need for state exceptions to the federal preemption
provision of the 1967 Act will be precluded if the EPA Administrator
promulgates emission standards for new motor vehicles as low as
technologically possible between 1971 and 1975, when the lowest emis-
sion standards take effect. The issue of federal preemption of new motor
vehicle standards should become academic in 1975, when the federal
standards will be as stringent as any state could technologically and
realistically want to adopt.
But there is some merit to the contention that between the years
1971 and 1975 all the states should, like California, be free to adopt
emission standards which are more stringent than the federal standards.
The constitutional requirement of equal protection of the laws"' should
afford the states grounds to test the privileged status accorded Califor-
nia. If the federal standards are appreciably more lenient than those
California establishes for herself between 1971 and 1975, then the
states may attack the constitutionality of the preemption provision,
arguing that they should be equally entitled to adopt stricter stan-
dards."'
2. Regulation of Fuels
Fuel combustion is the major cause of air pollution. Yet, definitive
knowledge of the deleterious effects of fuels and additives is still
meager.107 The 1967 Act did not regulate fuels or their contents. Rather,
monoxide by 69%, as compared to average emissions from pre-1968 model vehicles. The
improved test procedures will take into account typical urban driving patterns, will
sample actual emissions through the entire test cycle, and will rely on more accurate
testing instruments than were previously used. The new regulations also eliminate the
practice of averaging the test results of all cars in an engine class, which in the past
allowed high-emission vehicles to get by on the performance of their low-emission
brothers. The new procedures will apply to 1972 and subsequent model year vehicles
since the regulations took effect immediately and prototype testing of vehicles normally
begins one year in advance of production. See generally CCH Clean Air and Water
News, No. 46, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1970). These new regulations were promulgated under the
1967 Act, however, which the Secretary of HEW has interpreted as not allowing
assembly line testing. See discussion on pp. 578-79 supra. Presumably, with enactment
of the 1970 Act, HEW will amend these regulations to include provisions for assembly
line testing of vehicles.
194 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 202(b).
1" U.S. Coast. amend. XIV, § 1,
199 See generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 75, 84, 1195, 1212, 1236,
1365; Comment, Air Pollution, Pre-emption, Local Problems and the Constitution—
Some Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10 Ariz. L. Rev. 97, 101-03 (1968).
107 The Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution received numerous reports and
testimony during the Senate Hearings, tending to establish the extreme health hazards
posed by fuel additives such as sulfur and lead. Predictably, the manufacturers mini-
mized the hazards; citizen groups and private societies maximized them. For the more
informative reports, see 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 102-09, 433-35, 539-72,
1064-080, 1113-177. The Department of HEW reported in mid-October, 1970, that lead
poisoning "frequently causes sterility or early spontaneous abortion." This report was
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provision was made only for (a) research on air pollution caused by
fuel combustion" 8 and (b) the registration with the Secretary of HEW
of all additives in fuels.'" The latter provision, however, was never
enforced by the Secretary?" A sufficient base of scientific and technical
information is now available to indicate that certain fuel additives are
potentially perilous to human health. This is particularly true of lead
additives, which both contaminate the environment and deteriorate
devices installed on motor vehicles to control the emissions of other
pollutants.201 The 1970 Act continues the requirement that fuels and
fuel additives be registered with the EPA Administrator. 02 But more
importantly, authority is now given the EPA Administrator to regulate
the actual sale and use of fuels."' The procedure is as follows: the
EPA Administrator will designate fuels acceptable for use in vehicles.
Once designated, the fuel must be registered with the EPA before it can
be sold. If such fuel has not been registered, the Administrator will pre-
vent its being introduced into commerce. 204 The EPA Administrator
may either prohibit entirely or regulate the sale of any fuel which, when
evaporated or burned, endangers the public health or impedes achieve-
ment of effective emission control."' But in so doing, the Administrator
based on research conducted by the medical staff at the University of Alabama which
found that mothers who drank lead-contaminated moonshine whiskey manufactured by
persons using automobile radiators in stills gave birth to deformed babies. The study
also indicated the rising death rates caused by lead poisoning among ghetto children
who ate flakings of Iead-based paint from the walls of slums dwellings. CCH Clean Air
and Water News, No. 43, at 3 (Oct. 22, 1970).
1" 42 U.S.C. § 1857b-1 (Supp. V, 1970).
199
 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6c(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
200 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 483, 1044.
201 For an excellent treatment of the effects of lead and other fuel additives on
environment and health, see generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 93-95,
102-09 (the effect of lead pollution on climate and weather patterns); 433-35 (HEW
position on the effects of Iead on health); 1016-020 (effects of lead on auto pollution
devices); 1175-177 (effects of lead on environment); 504-05 (arguments in favor of
retaining lead as a gasoline additive).
202 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 211(a).
208 Id. § 211(c). This subsection also provides for federal preemption in the area of
regulation of fuel and fuel additives. California is exempted from this preemption
under § 211(c)(4)(B). In early November, 1970, the federal government ordered the
use of unleaded and low lead content gasoline of a maximum of 0.5 grams of lead per
gallon in government-operated vehicles. The order will result in an annual consumption
of roughly 270 million gallons of low- or non-lead fuel in such vehicles, and the removal
of 600 tons of metallic lead annually from such gasoline. Each gallon of regular gasoline
presently contains about 2.4 grams of lead. About 600,000 vehicles nationwide were
affected by the order. This government action was designed to encourage the develop-
ment of refinery and distribution capabilities for the marketing of lead-free gasolines.
The government is also engaged in a program to convert vehicles to the use of
natural gas, which is 90% pollution free. CCH Clean Air and Water News, No. 45, at
4-5 (Nov. 6, 1970).
204 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 211(a). Violation of the registration provisions
of § 211 subjects the fuel manufacturer to a "civil penalty" of $10,000 per day of
violation. Id. § 211(d). This penalty accrues to the United States government but is
only recoverable in a civil suit.
208 Id. § 211(c)(1). The Senate Committee observed two reasons for regulating
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must find that such a prohibition or control will not result in the use of
any other fuel that would produce equal or greater hazards to the public
health or welfare.200 No fuel or fuel additive may be controlled or pro-
hibited by the Administrator until he has considered all relevant medi-
cal, scientific, technological and economic factors 2U7 On request of a
manufacturer of motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, fuels or fuel
additives, the Administrator will hold a public hearing and publish the
results thereof at the time he promulgates final regulations.'" Despite
the federal preemption in the area of fuel regulation, with the exception
of California, a state may control or prohibit the use of a fuel or fuel
additive in motor vehicles only if an applicable implementation plan
under section 110 so provides and if the Administrator approves the
plan.'" The Administrator may approve such a provision in an imple-
mentation plan only if he finds that the state control or prohibition is
necessary to achieve the national primary or secondary ambient air
quality standards which the plan implements.'
3. Alternatives to the Internal Combustion Engine
Based upon present trends, it is possible that by 1980 the increase
in the number of vehicles in densely populated areas will begin to out-
strip technological capabilities for reducing pollution from the internal
combustion engine. If by 1975 the automobile industry is unsuccessful
in modifying the internal combustion engine to meet prescribed emission
standards, and unless motor vehicles with an alternative, low-pollu-
tion power source are available, vehicle-caused pollution will continue
to menace the nation's health. Accordingly, the 1970 Act authorizes
the EPA Administrator to establish special emission standards for
research and development purposes, and to encourage and promote the
development of low-emission vehicles.'" The research conducted pur-
suant to this provision will also provide the EPA Administrator with
additional information as to whether the technology is in fact available
to meet the 1975 new vehicle emission standards set forth in Section
202(h) of the Act. More importantly, however, the 1970 Act provides
increased emphasis on efforts to develop low-emission alternatives to
the internal combustion engine."' Section 104 of the Act authorizes
expenditures of $350 million dollars from 1971 through 1973 for the
the sale of a fuel. First, the combustion or evaporation of such fuel from any engine may
present a direct hazard to health. Second, the fuel may have an adverse effect on the
general welfare, or an an emission control system or device. Since the nature of the
"general welfare" is less well defined than the concept of "public health," the EPA is
required to hold public hearings on any proposed prohibition or control predicated upon
the "general welfare." See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (1970).
200 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 211(c)(2)(C).
207 Id. I 211(c)(2) (A).
208 Id. § 211(c)(2)(B).
209 Id.	 211(c) (4) (C) .
219 Id.
211 Id.	 212.
212 Id.	 104(a) (2)(B), (C).
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purpose of developing such alternatives and for fuel research.'" Two
important features of this provision are that amounts appropriated will
remain available until expended, and that a legal basis is provided for
supporting demonstration projects involving the construction and in-
stallation of pollution control equipment in profit-making facilities in
order to gain maximum benefit from expertise in the practical applica-
tion of technology."' The National Air Pollution Control Administra-
tion developed a six-year plan, designed to run from 1970 to 1975, for
the development of alternatives to the internal combustion engine, in-
cluding both the control of emissions from conventional motor vehicles,
and the development of unconventional low-pollution vehicles.'" The
appropriations made in the 1970 Act will continue the important re-
search for alternatives.
For the purpose of developing low-emission vehicles, Section 212
of the 1970 Act establishes a "Low-Emission Vehicle Certification
Board""° which is empowered to certify, in accordance with prescribed
procedures, those vehicles which are "low-emission" and which are thus
suitable to replace high-emission vehicles presently being used by fed-
eral agencies."' Any party may submit a vehicle for certification—
private persons as well as the large automakers. Once certified, low-
emission vehicles will be purchased or leased by the federal government
at procurement costs of up to one hundred and fifty percent of the re-
tail price of the least expensive model vehicles for which they are
certified replacements.'" Moreover, in order to encourage industry
and private parties to develop "inherently low-polluting propulsion
technology," the Board, at its discretion, may raise the price the federal
government will pay to two hundred percent of the retail price of the
replacements, if the Board determines that the certified low-emission
vehicle is powered by "an inherently low-polluting propulsion sys-
tem."' Section 212 of the 1970 Act authorizes funds in addition to
those authorized under Section 104 22° for the purpose of encouraging
the development of alternatives to the internal combustion engine.
218 Spending for research relating to fuels and vehicles is authorized at $75 million
for fiscal 1971, $125 million for fiscal 1972, and $150 million for fiscal 1973. Id.
	
104(c).
214 5. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970).
215
 Id. at 5.
218 The Board is to be composed of the Administrator or his designee, the Secre-
tary of Transportation or his designee, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality or his designee, the Director of the National Highway Safety Bureau in the
Department of Transportation, the Administrator of General Services, and two members
appointed by the President. The President will appoint the Board Chairman. Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 $ 212(b).
217 Id. 212(d). In making its determination the Board must consider numerous
criteria: safety of the vehicle, performance characteristics, reliability, potential, service-
ability, fuel availability, noise level and maintenance costs as compared with the class
or model of motor vehicle it may replace. Id.
218 Id. $ 212(e).
219 Id.
220
 Section 212 authorizes $55 million for the fiscal three-year period 1971-73. This
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It appears, however, that the automobile industry has chosen to
attempt to clean up the internal combustion engine rather than to
develop an alternative propulsion system. 221 Senator Muskie indicated
during the Senate Committee Hearings that during his seven years on
the Committee the automobile industry has shown no sense of urgency
with respect to developing alternatives to the internal combustion
engine.222 Only General Motors has recently indicated a serious finan-
cial commitment to invest in a propulsion system other than the conven-
tional internal combustion engine by purchasing the rights to the Wankel
rotary engine. 223 No one knows for certain whether the automobile
industry can achieve the 1975 standards with the internal combustion
engine. If the industry can, it has indicated precisely the contrary. 224
But the urgency of the situation requires that the industry and the fed-
eral government move with all haste to develop alternatives by 1975 in
the event that the 1975 standards cannot be met with the internal
combustion engine.225 It must be kept clearly in mind that the 1975
amount is in addition to the $350 million authorized under f 104 for purposes of
research and development of Iow-polluting vehicles and fuels.
221 See generally 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 1012, 1024-027 (Ford
Motor Company indicates that it will not abandon the internal combustion engine),
1062 (General Motors takes the same position). By way of contrast, see Id. at 197,
360-62 (efforts by HEW to stimulate and federally finance development of alternatives),
904 (Department of Transportation efforts), 1222 (Senator Muskie urging development
of alternatives). The Subcommittee heard testimony during the Hearings to the effect
that General Motors spends $250 million annually on advertising; that it annually
grosses $24 billion; and that it spends only $15 million on research and development.
Id. at 1222.
222 Id.
220 General Motors, in November, 1970, paid $50 million to buy the rights to this
small German rotary, as opposed to piston engine. The engine, developed in 1954 by
Felix Wankel, is essentially a variant of the internal combustion engine, but GM seems
to be confident that it can be refined sufficiently to meet the 1975 emission standards.
The automakers seem to have ruled out turbines, steam engines and battery powered
models as either too costly or impractical. In. the Wankel engine, gasoline is burned,
the energy produced is harnessed to turn a shaft which drives the wheels. But the
energy in the Wankel engine is captured more directly than in a piston engine. Instead
of first creating an up-and-down motion and then converting that to a rotating motion,
the Wankel burns its fuel in unusual oblong chambers forcing a triangular rotor to
turn in a circular motion. The triangular rotor is attached directly to the drive shaft,
which powers the wheels. Auto engineers indicate that about 90% of the pollution
caused by the piston engine occurs during the first few minutes or miles of operation.
The problem is that the engine is still cold, and even effective pollution-control devices
have trouble cleaning the exhaust if the engine is not hot enough. The Wankel engine
heath up almost instantly, thus allowing the cleaning device to burn off harmful fumes.
The Wankel seems to provide numerous appealing features ranging from low costs to
adequate power. Most important, however, is the observation by University of Michigan
researchers that with the help of relatively unsophisticated devices, the Wankel has
already come "very close" to meeting the 1975 standards required by the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970. With GM's resources behind it, the Wankel could very possibly
be developed to meet the 1975 emission standards. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1970,
at 1, col. I.
224 "Detroit Fights Back," Newsweek, Nov. 30, 1970, at 81.
223 A group of students from Wayne State University in Detroit recently but-
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standards are based upon pollution levels vital to the protection of
public health, and are not merely a frivolous attempt to harass the
automobile industry or to inconvenience the driving public. With this
in mind, it would seem that if by 1975 the internal combustion engine
cannot be redesigned to comply with the standards required under the
1970 Act, the availability of an alternative power source will be essen-
tial. Initiation of timely action now, directed toward the development
of such an alternative, would seem a far more prudent application of
the limited time and resources available than deferral of such a quest
until 1975, when pollution levels may well be critical, and the search for
alternatives desperate. Simultaneously, during the period from 1971 to
1975, federal funds should be diverted from the construction of addi-
tional highways in order to subsidize major expansion of local mass
transit systems. A reduced dependence upon the automobile, developed
through the increased availability of convenient public transportation,
would contribute considerably to abating vehicular air pollution. 228
Apparently, the automobile industry has chosen to gamble on
the internal combustion engine. But in so choosing, it should not be
permitted to gamble with the health of the nation. If the industry loses
its gamble, it is clear that the internal combustion engine must be out-
lawed within a specified time.227 A bill to ban the internal combustion
engine in California, a state with long and frustrating experience in
combating automotive air pollution, was narrowly defeated in 1969. 228
A similar provision was offered as an amendment to an early version
of the 1970 Act,22° but was not included in the final version. Such pro-
posals would have seemed too drastic several years ago, and while they
are still impractical, the near passage of the California bill has put the
automobile industry on notice that the nation intends to secure clean
air.2" Accordingly, the inclusion of federal financial support for re-
tressed hopes for attainment of the 1975 standards by winning the 1970 Clean Air "race"
in a vehicle powered by a modified internal combustion engine. They drove a Ford
vehicle equipped with two platinum catalytic mufflers for the control of hydrocarbons
and carbon monoxide; and two additional catalytic mufflers for control of nitrogen
oxides. The vehicle was equipped with an exhaust gas recirculation system, electric fuel
pump, insulated fuel lines and a temperature-sensing carburator; it burned lead-free
gasoline. To win the cross-country "race" from Massachusetts to California, a vehicle
had to perform well, be practical, relatively low in cost, capable of mass production,
and low in pollutant emissions. Emissions from the Wayne State vehicle were well
below the 1975 standards set by the 1970 Act. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at
1656-658; New Republic, Oct. 3, 1970, at 8. Subsequently, the National Air Pollution
Control Administration (NAPCA) invited the Wayne State group to test their vehicle
at federal laboratories under the Federal Clean Car Incentive Program to see how viable
an alternative It might be to motor vehicles presently used by the public. CCH Clean
Air and Water News, No. 41, at 13 (Oct. 9, 1970).
226 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 899, 1193, 1227-228.
227 See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 851, 1366, 1656-659.
228 Cal. S. Bill 778, 1969 Reg. Sess.; 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 179, at 1366.
220 Amendment No. 815 to S. 3229, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
280 On prohibiting the sale of the internal combustion engine, or of vehicles with
excessive horsepower, see Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and
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search to develop alternatives to the internal combustion engine is as
important a provision as can be found in the entire 1970 Act.
4. Enforcement of the Standards
a. Federal Enforcement Power. Two major weaknesses of the
1967 Act were lack of adequate pollution prevention measures and lack
of strong enforcement sanctions. The 1970 Act has strengthened both.
The federal government will play its role in enforcing the tough 1975
standards through the provisions authorizing the EPA Administrator
to test motor vehicles on the assembly line to assure that they meet
the standards. 231 As noted earlier, the testing procedure used by HEW
under the 1967 Act was both a misinterpretation of the power HEW
had been granted and a failure to enforce adequately the federal stan-
dards for new vehicles.' Section 206(c) of the 1970 Act makes clear that
the EPA Administrator has the authority to test vehicles on the pro-
duction line, and is not restricted to testing mere prototype models
submitted by the manufacturers.'" If the EPA Administrator finds that
assembly-line vehicles are not meeting the standards for which the
EPA had granted certification, he may revoke certification and with-
hold it until satisfied that compliance with the standard will be
achieved.234 The manufacturer will not be permitted to distribute al-
ready manufactured vehicles to dealers during the period of suspen-
sion or revocation. 235 Hopefully, further production would also be
banned until certification is reinstated. Otherwise, the non-conforming
vehicles could enter the stream of commerce, to the detriment of the
public health. After the EPA Administrator notifies the manufacturer
of suspension or revocation of certification, the latter may obtain, upon
request, a public hearing to appeal the suspension. The appeal, however,
will not stay the suspension.23° The EPA Administrator's final de-
cision is subject to review by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the circuit
in which the manufacturer resides or has his principal place of busi-
ness.237 The Administrator is also required to publish, in a non-techni-
Federal Pre-emption, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1100-101 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Currie].
231 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 206.
232 See discussion on pp. 578-79 supra.
233 To enforce the automobile standards promulgated in the 1970 Act, the EPA
inspectors are authorized "to enter, at reasonable times, any plant or other establishment
of such manufacturer, for the purpose of conducting tests of vehicles or engines in the
hands of the manufacturer," or to inspect "records, files, papers, processes, controls and
facilities used by such manufacturer in conducting tests under regulations of the
Administrator." Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 206(c). See S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1970). The Administrator may request the assistance of qualified
independent laboratories in testing vehicles. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 206(a)(2).
234 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 206(b) (2).
235 Id. § 206(b) (2) (A). Under § 203(a) (1) of the 1970 Act, vehicles without the
Administrator's certification may not be introduced into commerce, subject to the
penalties prescribed in § 205.
2110 Id. § 206(b) (2) (B) (I).
237 Id. g 206(b)(2)(B)(B).
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cal manner, the comparative performance of the new motor vehicles
tested in meeting the standards prescribed under section 202. In this
manner, at the beginning of each model year commencing with 1971,
the prospective ultimate purchasers of new motor vehicles can be
guided in purchasing new vehicles which meet the federal pollution
emission standards.23"
Every manufacturer at time of delivery must warrant to the
ultimate purchaser and each subsequent purchaser that the motor
vehicle or engine conforms to EPA standards.'" The manufacturer
must warrant that each vehicle will comply with EPA emission
standards for at least five years or 50,000 miles.' This obligation rests
solely with the manufacturer, and cannot be shifted by the latter to
dealers." In addition, all advertising circulated by the manufacturers
must contain a statement specifying the actual cost to the manufacturer
of included emission control devices or systems, including installation
costs." If the manufacturer finds defects in the system within the
five-year or 50,000 mile warranty period, it must notify the purchaser
or subsequent purchasers and repairs must be made by the manu-
facturer at no cost to purchaser or dealer." If the EPA Administrator
determines that a category of vehicles on the road is failing to conform
to standards, he must immediately notify the manufacturer and re-
quire the manufacturer to submit a plan for remedying the noncon-
formity, but the Administrator must hold a public hearing to review
his determination if the manufacturer so requests. 244
 Unless, as a re-
sult of the hearing, he withdraws his determination of nonconformity,
the Administrator shall order the manufacturer within sixty days to
notify the purchaser of the nonconformity.' As a condition precedent
to the manufacturer's absorbing the cost of repairs, the ultimate pur-
chaser and subsequent purchasers will have to demonstrate that the
288 Id. § 206(e).
239 The warranty must provide that the vehicle or engine is:
... (1) designed, built, and equipped so as to conform at the time of sale with
applicable regulations under section 202, and (2) free from defects in materials
and workmanship which cause such vehicle or engine to fail to conform with
applicable regulations for its useful life ... .
Id. § 207(a). Useful life is defined under § 202(d) as being five years or 50,000 miles,
whichever occurs first.
240 Id. § 202 (d).
241 Id. § 207(d).
242 Id. § 207(e). During the Senate Hearings the Committee heard evidence that
in 1965 an automobile manufacturer declared a $25 increase in automobile prices for
reasons wholly related to an alleged new and-pollution device; it was later disclosed
that the actual cost of the device to the manufacturer was only $5. Hearings on
S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1224 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
1970 Senate Hearings]. See generally id. at 1580, 1605. It was suggested at the Senate
Hearings, however, that this disclosure requirement may violate the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act. Id. at 1605.
243 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 1 207(d).
244 Id. § 207(c)(1).
248 id.
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manufacturer's maintenance requirements have been observed."' As-
suming that it takes another several months before the offending
vehicles are finally corrected by the manufacturer, the above pro-
cedures could take up to six months or more, from EPA inspection and
discovery of the defect to repair by the manufacturer. Effectively then,
a class of vehicles which the manufacturer has guaranteed will comply
with emission standards for five years or 50,000 miles could contami-
nate the air for months. With the public health at stake, this time-con-
suming process should be reduced to no more than one month: two
weeks during which public hearings are held; one week for the manu-
facturer to notify the purchaser; and one week to effect repairs of the
defect. At stake are months of poisonous atmospheric pollution re-
sulting from unnecessary procedural delays.
The original warranty provision proposed for pollution-control
devices called for guaranteed compliance with emission standards for
ten years or 100,000 miles. Congress yielded to manufacturer pressure,
however, and reduced these figures by one-half to five years or 50,000
miles. A further concession exacted by the industry during the Senate-
House Conference Committee proceedings has virtually eviscerated this
provision, however. The Committee agreed that the provision would
be retained, but stipulated that it would not come into effect until the
EPA decides that an adequate system exists for testing and inspecting
the pollution-control devices."' Lamentably, no deadline was estab-
lished by which the EPA Administrator must make this determination.
Assuming that the warranty provision does ultimately come into
effect, the 50,000 mile period can be assumed to last for approximately
four to five years of average driving. Salesmen, however, can accumu-
late mileage of this magnitude in a little over one year. It is thus also
regrettable that Congress decided to shift the responsibility for main-
taining air pollution-control devices from the manufacturer to the
purchaser after only 50,000 miles. If the purchaser is to pay what
doubtless will be greatly increased purchase prices for non-polluting
vehicles,' he should be guaranteed the full benefit of the bargain for
the life of the vehicle. The limited warranty of compliance provision
thus stands as one of the least desirable features of the 1970 Act.'
b. State Enforcement Powers. Under the 1970 Act the federal
government is fully responsible for enforcing the emission standards
for new motor vehicles. But, as noted earlier, the states are authorized
240 Id. § 207(b)(2).
247 Id. § 207(b). See Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
248 The anti-pollution devices could add as much as $300 to the cost of each
automobile. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
249 Many courts still require that there be privity of contract between the manu-
facturer and purchaser before holding the manufacturer responsible under a warranty.
In these jurisdictions, confusion may result as to what rights a second or third purchaser
has with respect to the warranty, despite the provision in § 207(b) that "the warranty
under such regulations shall run to the ultimate purchaser and each subsequent pur-
chaser .. ." For discussion of the issues raised by the warranty provision, see generally
1970 Senate Bearings, supra note 242, at 139, 1013-015, 1573, 1591, 1622-623, 1667.
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to enforce their own emission standards for used vehicles. 25° Under
Section 210 of the 1970 Act the Administrator is authorized to make
grants to state agencies totalling up to two-thirds of the cost of develop-
ing and maintaining effective vehicle emission inspection, testing and
control programs. Before a state implementation plan is approved
by the Administrator, the plan must provide for periodic inspection
and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable
emission standards 261 Neither section 210 (the provision authorizing
grants to state programs) nor section 110 (the provision governing
state implementation plans), indicates whether state inspection pro-
grams are restricted to inspecting only used vehicles and not new
vehicles. Both sections refer only to "motor vehicles." Although it is
clear from sections 202 and 209 that states cannot establish emission
standards for new vehicles, it appears that Congress intended that the
states enforce the federal standards for new vehicles in their inspection
programs, in addition to enforcing their own standards for used vehi-
cles. But, except for the financial assistance provided in section 210,
the states will receive no other federal assistance in dealing with the
problem of used-vehicle exhaust pollution. 252 This means that the
states are free to impose their own controls upon used vehicles regis-
tered within their boundaries, as California has done?" The states
may choose to legislate that all used vehicles be fitted with emission-
control devices in order to achieve compliance with the state emission
standards for used vehicles.
By inference, a "new" motor vehicle becomes "used," and sub-
ject to state control under section 209, when the vehicle has been
driven for five years or 50,000 miles. A different interpretation would
have the states intervening during the federally required warranty
period. States are thus precluded from regulating "new" vehicles which
have been driven up to 50,000 miles. Unless state emission standards
for used vehicles are as stringent as the federal standards for new
vehicles, the variance between the state and federal standards will re-
sult in automobile pollution levels higher than ought to be allowed.
Undoubtedly, some states will adopt emission standards for used
vehicles more lenient than the federal standards for new vehicles. To
that extent, some regions will be permitting higher levels of automotive
air pollution than other regions. This, in turn, could mean that the
federally promulgated. air quality standards and goals established
under Title I of the 1970 Act will take longer to achieve, to the detri-
ment of the public health. Although state cooperation in combating auto-
mobile pollution is both necessary and wise, it would appear that if
the individual states are to shoulder the burden of controlling the real
source of automotive air pollution—the used vehicle—they should be
2o See discussion on pp. 596-601 supra.
251 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 110(a) (2) (G).
252 See discussion on pp. 596-601 supra.
252 See note 168 supra.
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federally assisted with minimum federal standards for federally tested
devices or systems for used vehicles as stringent as those for new
vehicles. States should then be permitted to establish their own emis-
sion standards for used vehicles, based upon strict federal standards
as a minimum, but more stringent if the state desires.
The implementation plan requirement set forth in Section 110 of
the 1970 Act specifically requires that each Air Quality Control Region
develop inspection and testing programs for motor vehicles. Under
section 210 the EPA Administrator is authorized to make grants to
the states totalling two-thirds of the costs of "developing and main-
taining effective vehicle emission devices and systems inspection and
emission testing and control programs." But under a similar pro-
vision in the 1967 Act,'" not one state applied for the two-thirds grant
for developing an inspection program, and only New Jersey, under
other provisions of the 1967 Act, applied for and received a demonstra-
tion grant to support the development of emission testing procedures
suitable for inspection programs.'" Clearly, the states must move
quickly to implement inspection and enforcement programs to control
growing air pollution from used vehicles. The problem is that some
states do not yet even have an agency formed to qualify for a federal
grant, and some of those which have agencies lack the expertise either
to test control devices or to establish emission standards for used ve-
hicles. Some states will have difficulty in affording even the one-third
of the total cost of implementing an enforcement program, 266 Such
states should be granted additional federal expertise and financial as-
sistance, as needed. There are presently over one hundred million used
motor vehicles on the highways, and this number increases at a rate
of eight to nine million annually. 2" Only a small percentage of these,
those built after 1968, have any controls at all, and these controls have
proved highly ineffective.'" Used vehicles continue to endanger health;
and at present neither federal nor state governments, except California,
have begun to deal effectively, or at all, with this problem.
5. Sanctions for Non-Compliance
a. Injunctions. Under Section 204 of the 1967 Act, which was
unchanged by the 1970 Act, the district courts of the United States
are given jurisdiction to enjoin any violations of automobile emission
standards. According to this section, only the federal government can
bring an action to enjoin violations. 262 Only one such action was ever
initiated under the 1967 Act, a proceeding to obtain a permanent in-
junction against the illegal importation of new motor vehicles.'"
204 42 U.S.C.	 1857f-6b (Supp. V, 1970).
254 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 379-80.
250 See note 80 supra,
257 116 Cong. Rec. 16,093 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
268 See discussion on pp. 578-79 supra.
259 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-3 (Sum. V, 1970).
260 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 380. For a comprehensive treatment of
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b. Penalties. Any person"' who violates any of the automobile
pollution provisions of the 1970 Act will be subject to a civil penalty
of $10,000 for .each violation.'" Each motor vehicle or engine failing
to comply with the standards will constitute a separate offense."' The
penalty has been increased from $1,000 under the 1967 Act to $10,000
under the 1970 Act."' Although desirable, it is questionable whether
such an increase is meaningful, especially in view of the fact that no
penalties were levied at $1,000 under the 1967 Act. The most effective
penalty would be prohibition by the EPA Administrator and the states
of the sale or other introduction into commerce of any product which
causes air pollution, if that product fails to comply with the established
standards. Manufacturers would respond more quickly to the possi-
bility of losing their market completely. The EPA Administrator is
authorized to withdraw approval of new vehicles if testing demon-
strates that they fail to comply, or fail to continue to comply, with the
federal emission standards. Revocation of such approval should be
accompanied by an order prohibiting the introduction of such vehicle
or device into commerce. This provision, if fully implemented, would
provide the most effective sanction. Monetary penalties are unsatis-
factory because by the time such penalties are imposed, the pollution
damage has already been done. Arguably, the purpose of adequate
sanctions is the deterrence of air pollution practices, and not the rais-
ing of revenue. Prohibition of the entry of the offending vehicles into
the stream of commerce is clearly the more effective deterrent.
c. Citizen Suits. Throughout the 1970 Act Congress has care-
fully preserved the right of the public to participate at each step of the
air pollution abatement process: 265 at the establishment of standards
the use of injunctions in air pollution enforcement see Comment, Equity and the Eco-
System: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254 (1970).
281 "Person" is defined in the 1967 Act as including "an individual, corporation,
partnership, association, State, municipality, and political subdivision of a State." 42
U.S.C. 1857h(e) (Supp. V, 1970). Thus, under § 205 of the 1970 Act, the penalty
provision, a manufacturer or importer of a non-complying motor vehicle is subject to
the $10,000 civil penalty. But under § 203 (a) (6) of the 1970 Act, "importer" includes
private persons as well, so that any person or private citizen who imports a foreign
vehicle which does not comply with federal emission standards is also subject to a
civil penalty of $10,000.
262 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 205.
282 Id .
264 The Secretary of HEW did not levy any fines under the 1967 Act, despite the
fact that in some cases up to 80% of the vehicles tested from the road were failing to
comply with the emission standards issued for the prototypes. 1970 Senate Hearings,
supra note 242, at 363, 380.
206 During the Senate Hearings, Senator Muskie observed: "I know one of the
things industries don't like is this public participation. I like to give it the blessing of
national legislation by writing it into the law." 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242,
at 152. Since government agencies lack the adequate personnel, both in numbers and in
experience, to control air pollution effectively, private citizen suits can be a great aid to
controlling the problem.
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stage; 286 at the implementation of control programs stage; 267 and at
the enforcement stage.'" In another controversial provision of the 1970
Act, the Congress has authorized private citizens to bring suits on
their own behalf in the U.S. district courts to force compliance with
air quality and emission standards and regulations.'" The Department
of HEW and other federal agencies encouraged private and class ac-
tions to aid their enforcement efforts under the 1967 Act.'" Both the
Senate Hearings and the Senate Committee Report make it clear that
citizen suits under the 1970 Act are limited to actions for injunctive
relief, and that damages for injury to person or property are not re-
coverable under the citizen suits provision."' Provision is made for
actions against the polluter or government agencies (including the
EPA) or both."'
The significant elements of this important provision include the
following:
1. The federal district courts have original jurisdiction to en-
force air pollution laws regardless of the financial amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties involved.'
2. Civil actions to require enforcement of the pollution laws
may be brought by one or more persons on their own be-
half against any person, governmental agency, or the EPA
Administrator to compel enforcement of the standards,
orders or duties established under the 1970 Act. Including
governmental agencies within the class of persons to be
sued indicates that neither the agencies nor the EPA Ad-
ministrator can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
often a fatal impediment to compelling governmental
2" Clean Air Amendments of 1970 {§ 109(a) (1).
267 Id. § 110(a) (I).
289 Id . § 304.
260 Id.
270
 In June of 1969, at the annual meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association
in New York, ranking officials of the National Air Pollution Control Administration
(NAPCA) of the Department of HEW openly encouraged such suits. 1970 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 242, at 817.
271
 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 818; S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong.,
2d Sem. 38 (1970).
272 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(a).
273 "Amount in controversy" appears to have little meaning in air pollution suits.
The "amount of damage" to the public health and welfare is not susceptible to easy
measurement. Also, absent the citizenship provision in § 304 of the 1970 Act, a local
polluter of the same residence or citizenship as the plaintiffs would not be amenable
to suit in the federal district courts. The elimination of diversity and jurisdictional
amount considerations circumvents any barriers to federal jurisdiction which may
result from the Supreme Court decision in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), which
held that in a class action, separate and distinct claims may not be aggregated to
provide the $10,000 jurisdictional amount required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
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agencies to act. Section 304 does not, however, provide for
class actions. 274
3. Prior notice of the suit must be served upon (a) the EPA
Administrator; (b) the state agency involved; and (c) the
alleged violator."'
4. The courts may award costs of litigation, including reason-
able attorney and expert witness fees, to either party."'
The citizen suits provision unfortunately lacks a number of im-
portant elements which should have been included. Most significant
among these omissions was the failure to provide for recovery of
damages by plaintiffs. Relief is restricted to court orders requiring
compliance with the established standards. This means that a plaintiff
may not be awarded financial relief for injury done to his property or
274
 The original Senate Committee version of § 304 did include class actions as
well as citizen suits but the Committee decided to avoid the confusion and technicalities
of class actions enforcing air pollution laws and so eliminated them. 1970 Senate
Hearings, supra note 242, at 622. The provision is now drawn to avoid problems raised
by the class action provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Traditional class
actions under Federal Rule 23 involve (a) identification of the class of persons whose
interests have been, damaged; (b) identification of amount of total damage done to
determine if there is jurisdiction in the federal court; and (c) allocation of any
damages recovered. None of these issues pertains to the citizen suit provision. No
jurisdictional amount is required under § 304 and no provision is made for the recovery
of property or personal damages. S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970).
Provision is made, however, under § 304(e) of the Act, to preserve the rights of persons
as a class or as individuals under any statute or common law to seek enforcement or any
other relief. Thus, class actions are still available in suits predicated upon common law
theories such as nuisance, and Congress made it clear that it is not preempting the field.
For discussion of the question of class actions in pollution suits, see Comment, Equity
and the Eco-system: Can Injunctions Clear the Air?, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1254, 1272-274
(1970).
275
 Suit cannot be filed until the Administrator has had sixty days, after receipt
of notice, within which to institute enforcement proceedings to abate the alleged
violation. In addition, if the Administrator or state has commenced and is diligently
prosecuting a civil action in a federal or state court, no citizen suit may be filed. Any
person may, however, intervene in such an action in federal court, as a matter of right.
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(b). An exception to these requirements permits
the filing of a citizen suit immediately after notice has been given, if the alleged viola-
tion involves emissions of "hazardous pollutants" under § 112(c)(1)(B) or 113(a).
If not already a party to the action, the Administrator may intervene as a matter of
right in any citizen suit. If abatement proceedings are not begun within 60 days follow-'
ing notice, or if the citizen believes that enforcement efforts initiated by the agency
are inadequate, the citizen could then file his action. Because federal facilities generate
considerable air pollution, provision is also made for suits by citizens against the govern-
ment. Clean Air Amendments of 1970 §§ 118, 304.
275 Id. § 304(d). This provision eliminates potential financial barriers to citizen
groups with limited resources who may wish to initiate abatement actions against
comparatively wealthy industrial polluters. It has been estimated that the costs of
bringing such actions can amount to as much as $500,000. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra
note 242, at 1199. On the other hand, the provision also discourages frivolous suits, or
suits of harassment, since a court can award court costs, attorney fees and expert
witness fees to the alleged polluter, should the plaintiff lose. But under 304(d) the
court may, if an injunction is sought, require the filing of a bond or equivalent security
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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person; nor does section 304 permit the awarding of "clean-up costs"
following a destructive pollution violation. It is submitted that the
failure to allow recovery of damages under section 304 weakens the
citizen suits provision. Ideally, both injunctive relief and private
damages should be available both to deter prospective polluters and to
provide a broad range of available sanctions. 277
 Under the 1970 Act
the plaintiff no longer has to prove that the emissions in question are
of such a magnitude as to constitute a nuisance in the technical, legal
sense in order to obtain injunctive relief. 278
 Now, he need only show
a violation of the emission standards, a considerably easier task. 27°
Further, the mere compliance with federal standards should not pre-
clude the recovery of damages by an injured plaintiff. Compliance un-
der certain circumstances may, nonetheless, constitute negligence, and
such situations should be subject to jury appraisal to determine whether
the person responsible for "legal," but nonetheless damaging, emis-
sions has acted reasonably under the circumsta.nces.2"
It became evident during the Senate Hearings that government
277
 It was suggested during the Senate Hearings that the in ierrorem effect of
potential private damage actions would cause industries to initiate preventive mea-
sures against pollution. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 826. The allowance
of recovery of private damages alone, however, without an accompanying abatement
order could frustrate the purpose of the anti-air pollution statutes. Id. at 853. Illustra-
tive of such a result is the recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970), which
instructed the trial court to grant an injunction against a polluting cement company.
The court expressly stated, however, that if the company paid "permanent damages" to
the plaintiff, the injunction was to be vacated, thus permitting the cement plant to
continue polluting the air. The General Counsel of the Environmental Defense Fund, in
a letter to Senator Muskie, observed with respect to the Boomer case, ". . . the allow-
ance of damages—especially permanent damages—without also requiring abatement of
the polluting activity tends to assure the perpetuation, instead of the abatement, of
pollution." 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 853. For further discussion on the
question of allowing recovery of private damages under the 1970 Act, see generally Id.
at 623, 818, 826, 853, 1182-183,
278 Id. at 623.
279
 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 304(a)(1). With the aid of §§ 114(c) and
208(b), which require that the polluter keep records and reports, which are available to
the public, to demonstrate compliance with the standards, proof of violation of stan-
dards will be facilitated. The question thus will be one of fact as to whether there has
been compliance, and not one of law to establish whether pollution did or did not
exist. But there may be a Fifth Amendment problem, with respect to §§ 114(c) and
208(b) of the Act, on the issue of self-incrimination. This question has never been
tested in the courts, despite the fact that the 1967 Act contained a provision similarly
requiring the maintenance of discoverable records and reports. 42 § 1857f-6 (Supp.
V, 1970).
280 1970 Senate Hearings, supra, note 242, at 826, 833-34, 839. For a probing dis-
cussion which elaborates upon the questions presented by the citizen suits provision, see
the memorandum submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution,
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 242, at 1585-590. See generally id. at 816-61. The
automobile manufacturers were against the citizen suits provision for obvious reasons.
For the major criticisms of this provision by its opponents, see generally id. at 1606,
1625. See also the Senate floor debate on the provision. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,113-116
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
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agencies had been dilatory in seeking enforcement under the 1967
Act. A major defense of those agencies, including the Department of
HEW,281
 had been that they lacked adequate funds and staff to police
and regulate effectively the industries involved. Citizen suits will com-
plement the enforcement power of the government agencies. There is
ample precedent for private action as a supplement to enforcement of
federal regulatory statutes. The fields of antitrust litigation and se-
curities frauds afford two examples. In both of these areas, Congress
and the courts have relied upon private suits to aid enforcement, due
to the fact that both the Department of Justice and the Securities Ex-
change Commission are understaffed and unable to bring all the suits
necessary to enforce the regulatory laws.282
 The enforcement of air
pollution laws will benefit no less from private citizen actions.
6. Provisions for Appeal283
In the event that the automobile industry cannot sufficiently im-
prove the internal combustion engine to meet the 1975 emission stan-
dards, Congress has provided a "realistic escape hatch": 284 the indus-
try may petition the EPA Administrator for a one-year extension of
the 1975 deadline. 2" The procedure for obtaining the extension is as
follows: the manufacturer must petition the EPA Administrator at any
time after January 1, 1972, for a suspension of the emission standard
regulating carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons; and after January 1,
1973, for a suspension of the nitrogen oxide standard.'" The EPA Ad-
ministrator must then hold a public hearing on the request, and may
permit interested citizens to intervene.'" The filing of an appeal should
281
 See discussion on pp. 577-78 supra.
282 See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-33 (1964), in which the
Supreme Court found it necessary to "read in" a private cause of action to enforce
proxy rules because the Court reasoned that (1) private enforcement of the proxy rules
provides a necessary supplement to Commission action; and (2) as in antitrust treble
damages litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunctive relief serves as an
effective weapon in the enforcement of proxy requirements. See Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), in which the Court referred to
private suits as "a bulwark of antitrust enforcement." 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note
242, at 1482-484.
283
 The appeal procedures under the stationary-source provisions (Title I) of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, are discussed supra at pp. 591-93.
234 116 Cong. Rec. 16,224 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
285 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 202(b)(5).
285
 Senator Muskie explained the rationale of this timetable:
We wanted the provision for appeal to be made available late enough in this
5-year time frame so that the industry would make, and be forced to make,
a good faith effort toward achieving the objectives of the bill before resorting
to the courts. At the time, we wanted to provide that there would be sufficient
time to resolve the appeal and to get a decision so that the industry could then
respond to that decision in its production schedules.
116 Cong. Rec. 16,227 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). In this manner, Congress has provided
the automobile industry three years "lead time" in order to plan production schedules,
model changes, etc.
2" Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 202(b) (5)(D).
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not stay the industry's responsibility of complying with the standards.
The Administrator must act upon the petition wihin sixty days from
receipt.' He is authorized to grant the extension only upon a finding
that:
1. The extension is "essential to the public interest or the
public health and welfare of the United States; " 289
2. The manufacturers have made a good faith effort to meet
the deadline; 200
3. The manufacturers have established that effective tech-
nology was not available in time to achieve compliance; 29'
and
4. The study and investigation of the National Academy of
Sciences has not indicated that technology, processes, or
other alternatives are available to meet the standards."
If the Administrator grants the one-year extension, he must also promul-
gate interim emission standards which reflect the greatest degree of
control achievable under the technology existing at that time.' The
Senate version of section 202 had provided that the Administrator's
288 Id.
280
 Id. This section distinguishes between the "public interest" and the "public
health and welfare" thus raising interesting questions concerning what precisely is
encompassed by the term "public interest" if "health and welfare" are not. For example,
if it appeared that the economy of the United States would suffer severely as a result
of sanctions imposed for failure to meet the 1975 standards, thus at least arguably
harming the public interest, is it possible that in this circumstance, the Administrator
could grant an extension, notwithstanding the mandate of the Act that he do everything
possible to protect the "health and general welfare of the public"? This provision in
effect may allow the Administrator to base his decision upon economic and technological,
rather than health, considerations—precisely contrary to the salubrious intent of Title II
of the Act. In this connection it should be noted that nowhere in the 1970 Act is the
term "public interest" defined.
208 Id.
201 Id.
292
 Id. This provision could be the most important of the findings the Administrator
must make. In considering a petition for extension of the deadline, the Administrator
must take into account not simply the technology developed by the automobile manu-
facturers themselves, but technology developed by any engineering concern, if it has
proved effective in tests. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1970, at I,' col. 7; at 56, col. 1-2.
See also discussion concerning development of low-emission alternatives to the internal
combustion engine, pp. 604-06 supra.
2" Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 202(b)(5) (C). The Nixon Administration,
yielding to bitter opposition by the auto industry, attempted to pressure the House-
Senate Conference Committee into eliminating the 1975 and 1976 deadlines by which
the automakers must achieve compliance with the exhaust emission standards. Secretary
of HEW Elliot Richardson wrote to the Senate-House Conference Committee six weeks
after the Conference had already accepted the deadlines, and indicated that the Admin-
istration desired that the 1975 date be changed to a "hopeful target" but not a deadline,
and that the EPA Administrator be given authority to grant an unlimited series of
one-year extensions. Fortunately, the conferees rejected the President's proposal, and
decided that after the first one-year administrative extension only Congress could grant
further relief. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1970, at 1, col. 7; Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17,
1970, at 3, col. 2.
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decision granting or denying the one, one-year extension could be
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and then to the United States Supreme Court if certiorari were granted.
But the House-Senate Conference Committee deleted the provision for
judicial review of the Administrator's decision. This means that under
the Act as passed, environmental citizen groups are not expressly
granted standing to obtain federal court review of the decision granting
the extension. Similarly, in the unlikely event that the Administrator
denies the one-year extension, the automobile industry is also not ex-
pressly accorded standing to seek judicial review of that decision. It is
possible, however, that either group might be able to obtain review un-
der the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act." 4
Much Senate debate surrounded the question of who should have
the power to review the Administrator's decision."' It was recognized
that ". . . this may be the biggest industrial judgment that has been
made in the United States in this century.""° This recognition was
combined with the admission that congressional enactment of specific
standards into law is itself without precedent.' The urgency of the
air pollution problem was cited as the reason for the Congress so act-
ing. But the debate was most heated as the Senate considered an amend-
ment, ultimately defeated, which would have substituted congressional
review for judicial review 2°B Actually, Congress considered all three
branches of the government for possible powers of review: (1) ad-
ministrative review, by the executive branch (i.e., the Administrator's
decision would be final with no further review); (2) Congressional
review; and (3) judicial review. 24°
The major arguments against judicial review, and in favor of
congressional review, centered upon contentions that:
1. The Congress made this difficult policy decision concern-
ing the automobile industry, and the Congress should take
responsibility for reviewing its propriety ."°
2. If Congress were to make the decision as to the one-year
extension it could act within sixty days—thus avoiding
delays of up to two years if the matter were litigated in the
courts."'
3. Congress was leaving too many policy decisions to the
judiciary."'
294 5 U.S.C. 1);1 701-06 (Supp. V, 1970).
295 For the Senate floor debate on the question of judicial review of the granting
or denial of a one-year extension sec generally 116 Cong. Rec. 16,218-228 (daily ed.
Sept. 22, 1970).
206 Id. at 16,225.
297 Id. at 16,220.
298 See generally Id. at 16,218-228.
200 Id. at 16,224.
Boo Id. at 16,220.
891 Id. at 16,219.
aaa Id. at 16,218.
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4. Although the judiciary is less susceptible to political and
economic pressures, it is pressured by an increasing
backlog of cases and should be spared a difficult and time-
consuming decision such as the one concerning the one-
year extension.'
5. The question of granting or denying the extension is a
question of fact involving complex technological con-
siderations. The courts are ill-equipped to deal with the
difficult technical questions presented. If Congress had the
power to review, it would have the full benefit of all the
scientific background developed by federal agencies ex-
pert in the technological questions presented."4
The arguments made in favor of judicial review, on the other hand,
were considerably more compelling:
1. If the industry is not able to achieve compliance with the
emission standards, the question will be one of fact:
whether the automobile industry has put forth good faith
efforts to meet the emission standards, and whether it was
possible within the state of the art to produce a complying
vehicle. Questions of fact would best be tried by the judici-
ary, rather than by 535 legislators."
2. The court has the power of subpoena, of discovery and of
calling expert witnesses."
3. The emotion and pressure if the industry has not produced
a complying vehicle could be extraordinary. The courts
are by design and tradition less subject to political and
emotional pressure than the Congress."'
4. There has traditionally been a right to judicial review of
administrative decisions in the area of pollution control."
5. Without provision for judicial review, the industry would
have a clear argument of denial of due process. The courts
would most likely grant judicial review anyway, and the
review would not be limited to the statutory jurisdiction
for review of the one-year extension."
sos Id.
804 Id. at 16,220.
BOB Id. at 16,225.
806 Id. Under § 307 of the Act the EPA Administrator is given these same powers.
3° 7 In the course of the Senate debate on judicial review, Senator Baker argued:
The court in the sanctity of its judicial undertakings in the calm, cool,
deliberations of its fact-finding function, in its detachment from the immediate
pressures, is best suited to undertake this task than 535 legislators are, 435
of them standing for election in twelve months and one-third of the Senate
standing for election in 1976, to say nothing of the pressure and heat and the
confrontation of a political campaign for President in 1976. The Congress is
probably the least likely place to have clear, calm determination of that fact
issue. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,225 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
808 Id. at 16,226.
SOD Id.
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There was little support in the Senate for leaving the decision con-
cerning the one-year extension solely in the hands of the Administrator,
without review by either the judiciary or the Congress; the reasons
for the elimination of the judicial review provision were not made
clear by the House-Senate Conference Report,'" which is silent on this
point. It is submitted that the elimination of the provision allowing
for judicial review of the Administrator's decision was unwise. The
public should be entitled to be heard in the courts, regarding a matter
so important to its health.
Clearly the decision of the Administrator should be subject to
review, and the best forum for such review is the federal courts, for
the reasons indicated above. 3" Recent cases suggest that even in mat-
ters committed by statute to administrative discretion, it may none-
theless be possible to obtain judicial review.'" Indeed, in one recent
case the court commented that preclusion of judicial review "is not
lightly to be inferred . . . it requires a showing of clear evidence of
legislative intent."' The courts have granted standing to obtain such
review to those being regulated as well as to persons who seek "to
protect the public interest in the proper administration of a regulatory
system enacted for their benefit."'" The Senate Committee Report
accompanying the Senate version of the 1970 Act clearly indicated
that "precluding review does not appear to be warranted or desk-
able,"'" and for this reason the Senate Committee included judicial
review in its version of the bill. It would seem that, notwithstanding
the deletion of the judicial review provision from the final version of
the 1970 Act, judicial review with respect to the granting or denial of
the one-year extension should still be available, since Congress did not
substitute a specific provision evidencing a "clear legislative intent" to
preclude such judicial review.
If the automobile industry still has not achieved conformity with
the federal standards even after the one-year extension, the automobile
manufacturers would have to petition the Congress for relief from the
emission standards established under section 202 (b).3" If the Congress
refuses to grant relief, the automakers would presumably resort to the
courts to attack the constitutionality of the section 202 (b) emission
510 Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 17255, H.R. Rep. No. 91-1783, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1910).
all See the reasons enumerated on pp. 618-19 supra. See also the discussion of the
judicial review provisions in the portion of the 1970 Act dealing with stationary-source
polluters, pp. 591-93 supra.
812
 See the cases cited in note 139 supr a.
3121 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
(114
 Id. at 1097.
sts S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1970).
810
 116 Cong. Rec. 16,226 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
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standards.817 If the automobile industry appeals to Congress for relief,
the latter could act in any of several ways:
1. Congress could order the internal combustion engine off
the market and require the use of an alternative propul-
sion system, notwithstanding questions of impracticality
or economy.'"
2. Congress could relax the section 202(1)) emission stan-
dards and adjust them to comport with the state of the
art or technology in 1975.
3. Congress could impose strict horsepower limitations upon
vehicles—perhaps designating a maximum of 120 horse-
power on non-commercial new vehicles, or similar limita-
tions on the various classes of new motor vehicles. Lower
horsepower means lower octane gasoline, less combustion
of gasoline and less automotive air pollution."'"
4. Congress could reduce the number of vehicles on the high-
ways through the commerce power—by legislating a "one
vehicle to one family" standard or similar measures, while
concurrently providing for massive expansion of public
transportation systems.
All of the foregoing, with the exception of the second, calling for a
readjustment of the emission standards to comport with available tech-
nology, may give rise to constitutional challenges by either the auto-
mobile industry or the motoring public.' But some action will have to
be taken by 1975 or 1976, if the automobile industry loses its gamble
with modifying the internal combustion engine to meet the prescribed
emission standards, and if the nation's health is to be protected.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AUTOMOBILE POLLUTION
EMISSION STANDARDS
A. The Economic Issues Raised
The philosophy of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 has been
made clear: industry protestations of technological impossibility or
unfeasibility are no longer sufficient to avoid tough anti-air pollution
standards and deadlines."' In reporting to the Congress on the 1967
817 See discussion on pp. 624 et seq. infra, concerning the constitutional issues raised
by § 202(b) of the Act.
ala See Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution; State Authority and Federal Pre-emp-
tion, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1100-101 (1970).
an Id. at 1101; Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on
Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
120-21, 887, 893 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Senate Hearings].
szo See discussion on pp. 624 et seq. infra.
821 During Senate floor debate on the 1970 Act, Senator Muskie discounted industry
pessimism regarding ability to meet the proposed standards:
[T]he attitude of the industry prior to the time it was required to conform to
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Act, the Senate Committee on Public Works enunciated the rationale
underlying tough air pollution laws, economic considerations notwith-
standing:
The Committee recognizes the potential economic impact,
and therefore economic risk, associated with major social
legislative measures of this type. But this risk was assumed
when the Congress enacted social security, fair labor stan-
dards, and a host of other legislation designed to protect the
public welfare. Such a risk must again be assumed if the
nation's air resources are to be conserved and enhanced to
the point that generations yet to come will be able to breathe
without fear of impairment of health. 322
But the 1967 Act turned out to be no risk at al1. 323 The 1970 Act,
however, if properly implemented, could bear out the rationale of the
foregoing statement, and economic repercussions could be felt around
the world if the automobile industry cannot produce a complying
vehicle by 1976.
As the only major opponent to the 1975 automobile emission
standards, Senator Griffin of Michigan, argued the automakers' eco-
nomic response to the tight controls:
1. The availability of automotive transportation is a basic
factor in the personal economy and way of life of the
very people sought to be protected. The manufacture,
sale, and servicing of motor vehicles is a vital industry
in the U.S. economy. 824
2. This vital industry is to be required by statute to meet
standards which cannot be met with existing technology.
Further, these standards were established by the Commit-
tee without benefit of hearings as to whether they could
be met.32°
3. Over 800,000 Americans are directly dependent upon the
auto industry for their livelihoods; more than 14 million
jobs are dependent upon its products-28 percent of all
non-farm employment in the United States. 32°
the California standards was the same as it is in this case. They said it could
not be done. But, it was done . . • .
. . . Since the late 1940's, a quarter of a century ago, the industry has been
occupied with this problem by its own statements. It has been developing
technology. Every time it is pressed to apply technology it pleads for time. It
says it is not possible. It said this to California in 1964. It said this to us in the
hearings in 1964 and in 1965. It says it again now.
116 Cong. Rec. 16,228 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
322 116 Cong. Rec. 16,092 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
323 See discussion on pp. 577-80 supra.
324
 116 Cong. Rec. 16,220 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
325 Id.
326 Id. at 16,220-221.
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4. Automobiles and trucks generate 10 percent of all taxes
collected by federal, state, and local governments com-
bined-16 percent of the gross national product. Even a
slight dip in auto sales sends shock waves through the
financial community. 827
5. The Act demands that the industry make within 18 to 30
months a technological breakthrough which has withstood
more than 15 years of research.'"
6. "In short ... this bill holds a gun at the head of the Ameri-
can automobile industry in a very dangerous game of eco-
nomic roulette."'
The industry's prophecies of economic doom are without merit.
Congress has mandated that the automobile's endangerment of the
public health must be terminated. Various procedural safeguards in the
1970 Act guarantee that if the industry makes a good faith effort, but
cannot technologically comply with the standards established in the
Act, it can seek relief from Congress or the judiciary!'" But it must
try, for the sake of everyone's health, to improve an instrumentality
clearly dangerous to the public health. It seems incongruous for the
automobile industry to argue economics versus health, when the nation's
economy ultimately depends upon the health, and the ,existence, of the
buying public. The problem of air pollution has assumed such an
urgency that no economic argument, should stand as an obstacle to
purifying our air.
In measuring the congressional power to protect the health and
welfare of the public, former Department of HEW Secretary Arthur
S. Flemming cautioned:
[1] here is one thing that a responsible government cannot
do. It cannot fail to place at the top of its list of priorities
the health of all the people even though by so doing, it may
be or may appear to be acting against the economic interests
of a segment of our society."'
827 Id. at 16,221.
828 Id .
829
 Id. For an elaboration of the automobile industry's economic arguments, see
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 1608-610, 1626.
880
 In an exchange with Senator Griffin on the Senate floor, Senator Muskie
commented:
The deadline is based not, ... on economic and technological feasibility, but on
considerations of public health. We think, on the basis of the exposure we have
had to this problem, that this is a necessary and reasonable standard to impose
upon the industry. If the industry cannot meet it, they can come back Cto the
Congress].
116 Cong. Rec. 16,095 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
881 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 639-40. In discussing the congressional
power to act in the interest of the health and safety of the people, Justice Frankfurter's
remarks on the Food and Drug Act of 1906 are equally applicable to the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970:
The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was an exertion by Congress of its power to
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The overriding objective sought to be accomplished by Congress
throughout the 1970 Act is the protection of the health of the consuming
public. The public health must be considered ab initio, for "the eco-
nomic viability of a dead community would not mean much." 832
B. The Legal Issues Raised
The Administrator of the EPA is authorized to withhold certifica-
tion of new motor vehicles which fail to comply with federally estab-
lished emission standards, and to prohibit their entry into commerce
until they comply. 333 If the internal combustion engine is not modified
to comply with the standards set for 1975, those standards could oper-
ate to prohibit its further use. Strictly speaking, the prohibition of the
further entry into commerce, or the sale or use of internal combustion
engines is more than an emission regulation. It is arguably a regulation
of the sale of engines and, concomitantly, of the sale of motor vehicles
themselves 934
 If the Administrator must, in fact, find it necessary to
use the drastic tool of total exclusion of the internal combustion engine,
two questions arise: (1) upon what power can Congress sustain the
constitutionality of section 202(b), the emission standards provision,
and (2) to what constitutional attacks from the automobile industry
is this provision susceptible?
The congressional power to control automobile air pollution arises
out of the commerce clause.'" Because the automobile is engaged in
interstate transportation, is using interstate highways, and causes air
pollution which, arguably, is itself moving in "interstate commerce,'"
keep impure and adulterated food and drugs out of the channels of commerce.
By the Act of 1938 Congress extended the range of its control over illicit and
noxious articles and stiffened the penalties for disobedience. The purposes of
this legislation thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which, in the
circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection. Regard
for these purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if it is to be
treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a collection
of English words.
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943). See brief for petitioners, En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Finch, 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 639-40.
882 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at 1025.
833 Clean Air Amendments of 1970 § 206.
884 Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: State Authority and Federal Pre-emption,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 1083, 1100 (1970).
838 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The extent of congressional power to regulate
commerce among the states was defined by Chief Justice Marshall in the landmark case
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824):
It is the power to regulate; that is to prescribe the role by which commerce
is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the Constitution . . . It is no objection to the
assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is
attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power
of the states.
830 See Edelman, Federal Air and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce
Power to Abate Interstate and Intrastate Pollution, 33 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1067, 1071
(1965); Comment, The Federal Air Pollution Program, 1968 Wash. U. L.Q. 283, 319-21
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automobile pollution was considered to be properly within the ambit of
congressional regulatory power. In United States v. Bishop Processing
Co.,8" a federal district court recently held that the 1967 Clean Air Act
represented a constitutional exercise of the congressional commerce
power since the movement of air pollution across state lines constituted
interstate commerce subject to regulation by Congress.na The court
found that an economic relationship exists between the Clean Air Act's
regulation of interstate air pollution and the protection of commerce
since "malodorous pollution which 'adversely affects business conditions
and property values and impedes industrial development' would clearly
interfere with interstate commerce." 339 It has long been held that the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to prohibit it entirely 840
The United States Supreme Court has held that Congress can "regulate
interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use
of such commerce as an agency to promote . . . the spread of any evil or
harm to the people of other States from the state of origin."air The
regulation of air pollution, which has been medically shown to be
deleterious, if not destructive, to health, is clearly within the commerce
power of Congress.
But the principal issue which could confront the United States
Supreme Court sometime in 1975 or 1976 is whether the Congress has
exceeded its commerce power in enacting Section 202 (b), the auto-
mobile emission standards provision of the 1970 Act. In past cases
involving control of pollution, the Court has dealt only with suits
requiring local businesses, not an entire industry, to comply with
existing, and not future technology. However, Section 202(b) of the
1970 Act ,requires that the entire automobile industry comply with
technology which does not presently exist. As a result, the Supreme
(1968); Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 512 (1949); United States v. Bishop
Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 630 (1968).
887
 287 F. Supp. 624, 630 (1968).
838 Id. at 630.
880 Id. at 631.
84° United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). The Court observed that:
Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restric-
tions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to
exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are
destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or
welfare . . . .
B 41 Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925). See also American Power and
Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90, 99 (1946); North American Co. v. S.E.C., 327 U.S. 686,
705 (1945). In the latter case, the Court reiterated "the well settled principle that Congress
may impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the channels of inter-
state commerce in order that those channels will not become the means of promoting or
spreading evil, whether of a physical, moral, or economic nature." 327 U.S. at 705. Thus,
the Supreme Court has upheld the application of the commerce power to the interstate
transportation of lottery tickets, Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) ; stolen cars,
Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925); kidnapped persons, Gooch v. United States,
297 U.S. 124 (1936); prostitution, Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917);
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); and to racial discrimination, Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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Court could be expected to be reluctant to enforce an "impossible"
standard, if the automobile industry can successfully demonstrate that
it was willing and technologically able to meet the standards originally
projected for 1975 by the Secretary of HEW under the 1967 Act, 842
but that it absolutely cannot develop the technology necessary to meet
the standards set under the 1970 Act for 1975. If Congress compelled
the auto industry to cease use of the internal combustion engine, would
such action be too "drastic" and unreasonable?"' The Court has never
before had to render a decision with economic repercussions as massive
as are possible in this case.344 Thus, the auto industry might be expected
to attack the 1970 Act on the grounds that Congress, in enacting such
stringent standards, exceeded its commerce power. The automakers
could proffer several constitutional arguments, predicated upon both
conventional notions of due process and the doctrine of "inverse con-
demnation."
1. Due Process
Industry arguments that Congress violated the Fifth Amendment
requirement of due process in enacting section 202(b) might focus
upon either of the following contentions: (a) that the procedure fol-
lowed by Congress in enacting this provision violated legislative or
law-making due process; and (b) that the provision itself is violative
of due process, because the emission standards are impossible of
achievement within the prescribed time limit. The jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court to adjudicate the question of congres-
sional legislative due process was reiterated in the recent case of
Powell v. McCormack 346
 In that case the Court declared:
Especially is it competent and proper for [the Supreme
Court] to consider whether [congressional] proceedings are
in conformity with the Constitution and laws, because, living
under a written constitution, no branch or department of the
842 See note 148 supra for a table comparing the standards originally projected by
HEW for 1975 with the standards Congress established in § 202(b) of the 1970 Act.
843 In a recent New York Court of Appeals ruling, the court awarded damages but
refused to issue an injunction absolutely prohibiting operation since immediate shutdown
was "too drastic," and development of abatement techniques required total industry
effort over an indeterminate period of time. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. Inc., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (1970). Arguably, however, the auto industry has had
more than the 1970 to 1973 period to develop its techniques; it was told by Congress
to begin in 1964. The period from 1964 to 1975 seems sufficient. See 116 Cong. Rec. 16,095
(daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
844 During both the Senate Hearings and the Senate floor debate on the 1970 Act,
advocates of the auto industry maintained that the allegedly minimal advantages to be
gained through the Act were far outweighed by the economic impact which would be
suffered by the auto industry and the nation. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 319, at
1031, 1615. 116 Cong. Rec. 16,221 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970). By way of contrast, see
Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68 Mich. L.
Rev. 1073 (1970), in which the author argues that economic arguments should not be
given much weight as regards stationary sources of pollution.
848 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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government is supreme; and it is the province and duty of the
judicial department to determine . . . whether the powers of
any branch of the government, and even those of the legisla-
ture in the enactment of laws, have been exercised in con-
formity to the Constitution; and if they have not, to treat
their acts as null and void."'
For Congress to establish precise standards without first holding hear-
ings to ascertain whether such standards are achievable is reportedly
without precedent."' No administrative agency may set standards or
regulations without first holding public hearings at which all interested
parties, including those to be regulated, may testify. In fact, the 1970
Act requires that every other standard or regulation which the EPA
Administrator must establish may be formulated only after public
hearings have been held. Nonetheless, a due process argument based
upon the failure of Congress to hold hearings on section 202 (b) should
fail. Congress determined that it was able to infer from all of the
testimony held during both the lengthy 1970 Hearings, and the 1967
Hearings, that the standards established under section 202(b) were
realistic and achievable. The Senate Committee reported that specific
hearings on this provision were not necessary;"" that the urgency of
the air pollution problem required that technology be pushed forward
by such emission requirements."'
There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of a congres-
sional enactment, and the burden of proving its unconstitutionality is
an extremely formidable one."" The burden would be upon the auto-
makers to establish that facts sufficient to justify the strict emission
standards did not exists" This effectively means proving that: (a) if
the Senate Committee had held hearings, the facts needed to justify the
strict emission standards would not have been found; (b) the 202 (b)
standards are more severe than the air pollution problem requires; and
(c) the 202 (b) standards are impossible to achieve within the alloted
time period. The thrust of proving the foregoing would be the conten-
tion that in legislating without giving the industry a chance to be heard,
Congress acted arbitrarily and went beyond necessary and reasonable
bounds to accomplish its objective of controlling air pollution. But when
the legislative purpose intended is the protection of the public health
and welfare, and Congress bases its action upon what it considers to be
quantitatively sufficient proof that such strict standards are urgently
needed, the presumption of the constitutionality of legislation should
840 Id. at 506, quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199 (1881).
847 116 Cong. Rec. 16,220 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1970).
848 116 Cong. Rec. 16,095 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
849 Id.
350 Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 N.J. Super. 366,
382, 242 A.2d 21, 29 (1968).
851 See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kandle, 105 N.J. Super. 104, 114, 251 A.2d 295,
300 (1969).
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prevail, absent a showing of clear congressional error. 352 Congress has
complete power to determine the procedure through which it will find
facts, and to enact necessary laws based upon its findings. It is sub-
mitted that an attack on the 1970 Act based upon congressional viola-
tion of law-making due process must fail.
The second foreseeable due process attack on section 202 (b)
would be predicated upon the argument that even if Congress did not
violate law-making due process, the emission standards themselves are
arbitrary, unreasonable, and lack a rational relationship to the purpose
intended.353
 Clearly, the legislative purpose inherent in the automobile
provisions of the 1970 Act is the protection of the public health. Con-
gress has determined that urgency requires the severe emission stan-
dards established in section 202 (b). The burden is again upon the
automakers to rebut the strong presumption of constitutionality inher-
ing in the Act and to prove that Section 202 (b) is unreasonable and
inappropriate.354
 State courts have generally tended to uphold the
constitutionality of statutes designed to protect the public health, and
have been unwilling to disturb legislative determinations unless they
are clearly arbitrary. 865
 The rationale in these cases is sound: if the
352
 One writer has indicated that congressional findings should rarely, if ever, be
disturbed on procedural grounds:
A legislature is theoretically competent to dispose of matters coming before
it without according procedural formalities to affected interests. It is vested with
full discretion and final authority subject to constitutional limitations . . . An
elaborate process of committee investigations, hearings and reports has been
developed for this purpose [law-making]. The extent to which this procedure
shall be used in particular instances, however, and the degree of participation
which shall be permitted to those concerned remain wholly within legislative
control.
Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-making, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 273-74 (1938).
See also Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rule-Making Relating to Public
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits or Contracts, 118 U. Pa. L. Rev. 540 (1970); Daddario,
Technology Assessment Legislation, 7 Harv. J. Legis. 507 (1970).
853
 See Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916): Sheafer
v. Joseph Breen, Inc., 263 App. Div. 135, 31 N.Y.S.2d 543 (1941); United States
v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (1968); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kandle,
251 A.2d 295, 105 N.J. Super. 104 (1969).
854
 See United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624, 630-31 (1968):
A court's review of such a Congressional finding is limited. The only
questions are whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that air pollu-
tion affects commerce, and if it had such a basis, whether the means selected
to eliminate the evil are reasonable and appropriate.
855
 See, e.g., Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 70, 164 S.W.2d 378, 382 (1942), in
which the Missouri Supreme Court summarizes the majority view on the constitutionality
of air pollution legislation by quoting from an earlier case, Nelson v. City of Minneapolis,
112 Minn. 16, 19, 127 N.W. 445, 447 (1910):
The methods, regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain, so far as
may be, results consistent with the public welfare, are purely of legislative
cognizance. The courts have no power to determine the merits of conflicting
theories nor to declare that a particular method of advancing and protecting
the public is superior or likely to insure greater safety or better protection than
others. The legislative determination of the methods, restrictions and regulations
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statute is designed to protect the public health, and if the means selected
are reasonably calculated to reduce air pollution, then the statute should
be sustained even if it results in great expense to the person being
regulated; a" or even if it causes an industry to cease operations
entirely 867
To bolster its argument that section 202 (b) is violative of due
process because it is arbitrary and unreasonable, the auto industry
might advance the "unavoidable necessity" arguments" The basic
thrust of this argument would be economic: that since no known equip-
ment exists which can solve the automobile pollution situation, and
since the automobile is such a vital factor in the economy, the neces-
sity of fluid transportation far outweighs the unavoidable result, that is,
emission pollution 8 6B A minority of cases has held that a business can-
not be required to meet any standard higher than technology permits,
and that shutting down a business entirely when technology is not avail-
able is "too drastic."'" But it is submitted that this argument should
also fail. Section 202 (b) compels not the shutdown of the automobile
industry, but rather the use of alternative propulsion systems, now
is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights
of the citizens.
859 Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 492 (1916):
Nor is there any valid Federal constitutional objection in the fact that the
regulation may require the discontinuance of the use of property or subject the
occupant to large expense in complying with the terms of the law or ordinance.
867 Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 N.J. Super. 366,
394, 242 A.2d 21, 35 (1968). But see People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413,
21. N.E.2d 489 (1939), in which the court held that a regulation of smoke is valid only
if it is limited to prohibiting discharge of smoke avoidable by use of modern and
practicable methods; that if it were impossible to avoid smoke, then the ordinance was
clearly unreasonable, and an undue burden on interstate commerce exceeding the power
of the state; People v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 268 Cal. App.2d 501, 74
Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968), which held that a state statute placed an undue and unreasonable
burden on railroad operations because the technology did not exist which could cure the
defect in question, the emission of great quantities of smoke by locomotives. The court in
that case distinguished Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) in
which the Supreme Court upheld a city smoke-abatement ordinance, because in Huron,
technology to control the emission of smoke was available. It should be remembered,
however, the Cunard and Atchison cases involved stale statutes, in which the police
power was held to conflict with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
There would not be such a conflict in a suit brought by the automakers attacking the
emission standards under the 1970 Act. The issue there would be whether Congress
itself has the power to regulate, i.e., prohibit, the use of a type of engine which is
clearly injurious to the public health, and not a conflict between federal and state
regulatory powers. It is also important to recognize that in 1939, when Cunard was
decided, air pollution was not a serious threat to health; and that the Atchison ease
dealt with the railroad industry which was rapidly dying. The automakers have
alternatives at their disposal which were not available to the railroad industry.
868 See Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 100 N.J. Super.
366, 242 Aid 21 (1968).
859
 See, e.g., People v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 268 Cal. App.2d 501,
74 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
BO Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 119, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
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known to exist, 8" if the internal combustion engine cannot be purified
by 1975. Historically, the courts have rejected economic arguments
when dealing with air pollution legislation. Courts have enjoined sta-
tionary-source polluters even where it appeared that such an injunction
would result in a total shutdown of the business. Such a decision was
recently passed down by the New Jersey Superior Court:
The applicability of the [unavoidable necessity] doctrine
turns upon the reasonableness of the statute or regulation
under review and of the proscription imposed. Assuredly, it is
not unreasonable for the State, in the interest of the public
health and welfare, to seek to control air pollution. Even if
this means the shutting down of an operation harmful to
health or unreasonably interfering with life or property, the
statute must prevail.8"
The touchstone of the due process determination is whether the
statute or provision in question is arbitrary or unreasonable. Even
here the Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere with legis-
lative findings. In Sproles v. Binford, 803 the Supreme Court stated that
"debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for
the legislature." But if the Court must determine whether a law is
arbitrary or unreasonable, what guidelines will it follow? The Court
has stated that it will look to the nature of the menace against which
the law operates, the availability and effectiveness of other, less drastic
protective steps, and the loss suffered by the imposition of the statute.'"
It must be concluded that section 202 (b) is neither arbitrary nor un-
reasonable, in view of the fact that without such strict emission stan-
dards, the objective of Congress to protect the public health would be
frustrated.
2. Inverse Condemnation885
The Fifth Amendment declares that the federal government may
not take private property for public use without just compensation. If
801 Student groups and private and government researchers demonstrated in 1970
that alternatives such as electric and steam propulsion systems already exist, and that,
although at present they are still short of economic practicality, these systems could be
developed by the automakers so that mass production could become a reality. In addi-
tion, two vehicles propelled by the internal combustion engine, but using different types
of fuels, did achieve the strict 1975 emission standards. See 1970 Senate Hearings, supra
note 319, at 1656-657. But the automakers have chosen to gamble on a modification of
the internal combustion engine. See note 197 supra.
802 Department of Health v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 242 A.2d 21, 35,
100 N.J. Super. 366, 393-94 (1968); Oriental Boulevard Co. v. Heller, 58 Misc.2d 920, 297
N.Y.S.2d 431 (1969).
808 386 U.S. 374, 388 (1932); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firm/en & Enginemen v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129, 139 (1968).
884 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1961).
883
 Inverse condemnation is the popular description of a cause of action
against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has
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Congress prohibits the automobile industry from further use of the
internal combustion engine the question arises whether such action
would qualify as a "taking" in the constitutional sense. The automo-
bile industry might argue that the emission standards in section 202 (b)
are not regulatory but are completely prohibitory; and that the pro-
hibition of the further use of the internal combustion engine amounts
to a confiscation of property without just compensation. This argument
would embody the theory of "inverse condemnation" which has been
used by industry in the past to attack governmental statutes and regu-
lations.'" The Supreme Court has previously had occasion to review
governmental actions which resulted in considerable economic losses to
private property owners, and has generally held that federal or state
governments are not obligated to compensate the owners for these
losses."' When a government has had to pay compensation, the ration-
ale has been that the government should be barred "from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole."'" The traditional "burden"
which the public has been asked to share in these cases has been an
economic one, so that the private property owner would not unjustly
be deprived of his assets. The central issue in the "taking" cases has
been the determination by the court of whether the action taken by the
government was a compensable taking or merely a "consequential de-
struction" and hence not compensable. In Armstrong v. United States,8"
the Court discussed the difficulty of making such a determination:
been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking
agency.
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 180, 376 P.2d 100, 101 (1962).
800 The courts have held that the deprivation of the former owner rather than
the accretion of a right or interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Gov-
ernmental action short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if
its effects are so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest
in the subject matter, to amount to a taking.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1944). See generally
Symposium, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20 Hastings L.J. 431
(1969); Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately
Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 617 (1968); Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, (1964); Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Con-
stitutional Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 3 (1966).
501 In United States v. Caltex (Phillipines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952), the
Supreme Court held that "in times of imminent peril . . . the sovereign could, with im-
munity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many
more could be saved."
868 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). In Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), the Supreme Court expressed a similar view:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have
its limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone.
8°9 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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It is true that not every destruction or injury to property by
governmental action has been held to be a "taking" in the
constitutional sense. This [cited] case and many others reveal
the difficulty of trying to draw the line between what destruc-
tions of property by lawful governmental actions are compen-
sable "taking" and what destructions are "consequential" and
therefore not compensable.'"
The result, decisionally, has been a lack of order and an ad hoc treat-
ment of confiscation cases."' In United States v, Caller (Phillipines),
Inc., the Supreme Court stated that "[n]l) rigid rules can be laid down
to distinguish compensable losses from non-compensable losses."'"
Generally the courts have permitted the governmental use of police
power, without imposing liability to compensate, in situations where
the public necessity demands that an impending peril be immediately
averted.'" In such cases, the urgency of the situation constitutes full
justification for the measures taken to abate the menacing condition."'"
At common law, courts generally upheld the validity of such uncom-
pensated abatement actions as incident to the police power to eliminate
"public nuisances" or situations deemed inimical to the public wel-
fare.'" By statute, the federal and state governments now authorize
the seizure, forfeiture, or outright destruction of private property as
necessary to enforce legislatively determined regulatory policies.'" The
use of uncompensated confiscation or destruction of private property as
a means of enforcing regulatory policies has been sustained repeatedly
as being within constitutional limitations.'" The power to enact the
underlying regulatory policy has been held to include the power to
enforce that policy by all rational means available, including the de-
struction of property rights. In Mugler v. Kansas,"8 an early case
dealing with a state statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors within state boundaries, the Supreme Court held
that:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes
that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just
870 Id. at 48.
871 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. Ct. Rev. 63 (1962).
872 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952).
878 See, e.g., House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 25 Ca1.2d 384, 391,
153 P.2d 950, 953 (1944).
874
 Id. The court includes in such situations the destruction of diseased animals,
rotten fruit, and infected trees, where life or health is jeopardized.
878 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
878
 For a discussion of federal statutes of this type, see Note, Forfeiture of Property
Used in Illegal Acts, 38 Notre Dame Lawyer 727 (1963).
877 See Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
465 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
878 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for
the public benefit. . . . The power which the States have of
prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will
be prejudicial to the health, the morals or the safety of the
public, . . . cannot be burdened with the condition that the
State must compensate such individual owners for the pecuni-
ary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being
permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury
upon the community!'"
The weaknesses in advancing the argument that section 202 (b)
results in a "taking for public use," which is therefore compensable,
are several. Initially, the automobile industry must establish that fed-
eral prohibition of a type of engine, not all types of engines, qualifies as
a "destruction" of property, or a "taking" of property for public "use."
Serious doubt exists as to whether such federal regulation is a confisca-
don at all. The Congress, in section 202 (b), has legislated strict controls
in order that the public not be denied one of its most basic natural
rights, the right to breathe healthful, clean air. If there exists an in-
fringement of property rights, or a potential destruction of values, it
would appear that the automobile industry, absent the necessary fed-
eral controls placed on the air pollution it causes, would be the party
doing the confiscating. Automotive air pollution unquestionably "takes"
clean air from the public. If prohibiting the use of a type of engine, as
opposed to shutting down the automobile industry, were to be con-
sidered a "taking for public use," the concept of "use" would assume
a meaning certainly not intended by the framers of the Constitution.
To reach such a result, the term "use" would have to be interpreted as
including prevention of forced use by the public of an instrumentality
injurious to its health—a nuisance. That government can prohibit the
proliferation of a nuisance is too well established in the common law to
admit dispute. The public has the right to be protected from having to
use a vehicle which, although convenient and economically attractive,
is highly dangerous as compared to alternatives that might be, if the
automakers produced other types of engines, more expensive, but less
noxious. At present, the public has no choice but to purchase vehicles
propelled by the internal combustion engine, if private transporta-
tion is desired. Without federal stimulus in the form of strict emis-
sion standards in the 1970 Act, and heavy government funding for
research to develop alternatives, the automobile industry would be
permitted to continue compelling the public to use only the hazardous
internal combustion engine. In his famous dissent in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,880
 Justice Brandeis issued a sound doctrinal basis for
determining the definitional limits of "takings":
[U]ses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions,
870 Id. at 668-69.
880 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (dissenting opinion).
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seriously threaten the public welfare, Whenever they do, the
legislature has power to prohibit such uses without paying
compensation; and the power to prohibit extends alike to
the manner, the character, and the purpose of the use. . . .
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in
the exercise of the police power deprives ,the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment
by the state of rights in property without making compensa-
tion. But restriction imposed to protect the public health,
safety, or morals, from dangers threatened is not a taking. ...
The State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The
State merely prevents the owner from making a use which in-
terferes with paramount rights of the public. 881
The Congress has determined in the 1970 Clean Air Amendments
that the automakers must reduce pollution emissions to the prescribed
1975 levels. It has determined that a state of urgency exists which
imperils the public health, and that the regulation of automobile emis-
sions, and not the prohibition of all types of automobile engines, is
highly necessary. The industry is given the latitude to choose how it
will achieve the 1975 standards. It has apparently chosen to gamble on
improving the internal combustion engine rather than developing al-
ternatives with all deliberate speed. Such a choice cannot be deemed a
"taking" by the federal government, and a constitutional attack on
the 1970 Act based upon the theory of "confiscation without compensa-
tion" would be spurious. Rather, the government's action in enacting
section 202 (b) requires the automobile industry to conduct its business,
the manufacture of motor vehicles, in such a way as not to infringe
upon the paramount right of the public to enjoy clean air. If the public,
through federal compensation, were to subsidize the automobile indus-
try for the removal of an instrumentality dangerous to its health, the
ironic consequence would be that the public would be paying for its
right to breathe clean air.
CONCLUSION
The need to improve the quality of the air we breathe has been
made increasingly apparent by the proliferating and tragic air pollution
incidents of the past several years. The unparalleled economic growth
in the nation has not occurred without an attendant toll upon our
environment. Through the combined effects of stationary source pollu-
tion and motor vehicle air pollution, industry pours almost two hundred
million tons of contaminants into the air annually. In parts of the na-
tion, the air has already deteriorated to a point where school children
are not able to go outdoors for physical education on days when air
pollution reaches critical levels."' Only in recent years has Congress
881 Id. at 417.
382 Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1295-296 (1970).
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seriously addressed itself to the urgency of the menacing problem of
air contamination. Unfortunately, the short history of federal air pollu-
tion legislation has been marked by weak laws, which have been unag-
gressively and ineffectively implemented by the various levels of gov-
ernment. The 1967 Air Quality Act, a slight improvement over previous
federal regulatory efforts, was emasculated both by the failure of Con-
gress to appropriate the funds and manpower necessary for its success-
ful implementation, and by the failure of the Department of HEW to
enforce it adequately.
Motor vehicles, particularly used automobiles, continue to be the
largest single source of air pollution and, concomitantly, the most seri-
ous hazard to the public health. Congress has recognized that vehicular
air pollution absolutely must be reduced to medically safe levels, and
that the limitations of present technology should not prevent the
achievement of this goal. In enacting Section 202 (b) of the 1970 Act,
the stringent vehicular emission standards for new motor vehicles,
Congress challenged the automobile industry either to stop poisoning
the air by sufficiently improving the internal combustion engine to meet
the 1975 emission standards, or else, economic costs notwithstanding,
to stop marketing that type of engine.
The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 demonstrate the increased
federal commitment to the abatement of air pollution. This Act provides
greater financial support for state control and research programs;
stringent minimum federal standards for stationary and particularly
for moving source pollution; increased federal enforcement power and
direct federal enforcement assistance in state control programs; stiffer
sanctions for violators; and a new federally created right of enforce-
ment through citizen suits. But the experience of prior federal air pollu-
tion legislation indicates that the mere enactment of a new stringent
law will not produce meaningful results in the attack on air pollution.
If the struggle is to be successful, there must be a united effort on the
part of all levels of government: federal, state, and local; on the part
of industry, complying with the health protection standards; and on
the part of individual citizens, who must police their own practices, as
well as those of industry and those of the governmental agencies charged
with the responsibility for effective administration of the anti-pollution
laws.
One hundred years ago, the first board of health in the United
States, organized in Massachusetts, declared that:
We believe that all citizens have an inherent right to the
enjoyment of pure and uncontaminated air and water and soil,
that this right should be regarded as belonging to the whole
community and that no one should be allowed to trespass upon
it by his carelessness and his avarice, or even by his ignor-
ance.'"
883 116 Cong. Rec. 16,092 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1970).
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In enacting the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the Congress has taken
the first important step to protect that right. The next vital step will
be the full and effective implementation of the Act by the government
and the citizens. The 1970 Act will be a significant contribution to the
air pollution abatement effort only if it can avoid the evisceration which
has plagued its predecessors.
MICHAEL S. GRECO
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